PATENTS: JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS AND
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS*

THERE

SYLVESTER PETROt

are some things about the patent system that can never
be known as fully and directly as one might desire, e.g., whether
or not it has operated on the whole to retard technological development in the United States. On the other hand, there are many important things about the patent system that can be and are known. The
system has been in operation for over 15o years, and in that time it has
produced, as a glance at the digest of federal cases will show, more litigation than any other subject of federal jurisdiction except taxation and
bankruptcy. From an examination of some of this litigation and consideration of the nature of science, technology, and invention, it appears that
the subject matter is such as to make a fair decision in any vigorously disputed case concerning priority, validity, or scope of invention extremely
difficult, if not impossible. This is true, in brief, because in an extremely
signi cant sense, there is seldom an invention or a single inventor. In its
attempt to grant rewards to single inventors for single inventions, therefore, the patent system seems to have essayed the impossible. And from
this attempt a multitude of evils have resulted.
One can also know that the patent system has been one of the principal
factors in the growth of private monopoly power in the United States.
For this there is sufficient proof in the reported cases and in the facts that
have come to light in recent years. On the premise that monopoly power
tends to inhibit the vigor which competition tends to stimulate, it is possible to conclude that the patent system, since it is in large measure responsible for our monopolies, has inhibited industrial growth and socially desirable exploitation of invention. Such unfortunate consequences of the
patent system, and many others, are treated in some detail in the body of
this paper. An attempt is here made to trace a kind of natural history of
the patent system and to place it in its living position in the economy of
which it is an extremely important part.
One of the most sacred of contemporary sacred cows, the patent system
has had no significant legislative alteration in more than a hundred years.
* Part II. Part I of this article appeared in the December, 1944, issue of the Review.
t Member of the Illinois Bar.
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The same can be said of other vital politico-economic institutions. And the
net result has been a radical departure of political and economic fact from
the political and economic theory which is often said to dominate American thinking. Ridiculously fearful lest the national government should become too powerful, we have allowed, and even forced, private groups to
assume power and authority far beyond the danger point. This is as true
with respect to patents as it is, for example, with respect to corporations
and labor unions. Several proposals for reform of the patent system have
been submitted recently. A political theory is premised in this paper, and
the proposals are examined against that theory.
I
"These extracts from Court decisions have been given at some length
with the thought that, by giving the reader, interested in modem telephony, an opportunity to read the language used in them, he can perhaps,
better than in any other way, form a conception of the nature of the litigation that finally resulted in Alexander Graham Bell being fully sustained
as the inventor of the telephone." This statement ends chapter iv of the
book, Beginnings of Telephony (1929), written by Frederick Leland
Rhodes, an electrical engineer employed by the American Telephone &
Telegraph Company. While Mr. Rhodes did quote at length from various
inferior federal court decisions, the quotations were selected in a manner
which reveals that the devices commonly associated with the lawyer are
not unknown to other engineers. For one thing, Mr. Rhodes avoids any
emphasis of the most important decision in the whole telephone-patents
controversy, the only Supreme Court case which takes up a full volume of
the reports. And he fails completely to mention that that decision, upholding the Bell patents, went by a four to three majority, with Associate
Justices Field, Bradley, and Harlan dissenting.,
The quotations employed by Mr. Rhodes and the general slant of his
exposition give a one-sided picture of the telephone-patents controversya picture in which the doubtful aspects of the litigation and final settlement are minimized, when they are mentioned at all. The facts in the controversy here recounted are presented primarily to provide insight into
the operation of the American patent system. If the narrative tends to
cast doubt upon the validity of Bell's claim to fame as the sole and original inventor of the telephone, that result is simply an unfortunate byproduct of an attempt to show that the patent system, by purporting to
'The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1-584 (1888). Involving several parties, the cases nevertheless revolved around one issue-whether or not the patents granted to Alexander Graham
Bell were valid.
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grant exclusive rewards for inventions, has essayed a task which events
seem to prove impossible of execution without consequent confusion, conflict, and litigation extensive enough in themselves to induce grave question as to the net worth of the system. The telephone controversy arose
from no peculiarly complex technological problems. More abstruse problems arise daily in the Patent Office, and they cause the same kind of
trouble. The telephone controversy is chosen, for description here simply
because more of the facts are available and because the lapse of years affords a perspective for evaluation of the labors involved in establishing
the rights granted by the Patent Office.
On February i4,I876, Alexander Graham Bell filed with the United
States Patent Office an application for a patent on "certain new and useful Improvements in Telegraphy." On the same day, Elisha Gray filed a
caveat (a notice of an invention not yet completed) which begins as follows:
Be it known that I, Elisha Gray, of Chicago, have invented a new art of transmitting
-vocal sounds telegraphically ....It is the object of my invention to transmit the
tones-of the human voice through a telegraphic circuit, and reproduce them at the receiving end Of the line, so that actual conversations can be carried on by persons at long
distance5 apart.

"To -attain the objects of my invention," Gray's caveat continues, "I
devised an instrument capable of vibrating responsively to all the tones of
''
the human voice, and by which they are rendered audible. 2
In contrast to Gray's deliberate and forthright statement of the intention to transmit speech, Bell's application nowhere speaks of transmitting
speech-; it is preoccupied with the problems of transmitting multiple telegraphic signals over a single wire, although it clearly appears from Bell's
statements that the possibility of transmitting other sounds, including the
sound of the human voice, was recognized by him. The relevant portions
of Bell's application are as follows:
The duration of the sound may be used to indicate the dot or dash of the Morse
alphabet, and thus a telegraphic despatch may be indicated by alternately interrupting and renewing the sound.....
I desire here to remark that there are many other uses to which these instruments
may be put, such as the simultaneous transmission of musical notes, differing in loudness as well as in pitch, and the telegraphic transmission of noises or sounds of any
kind.
One of the ways in which the armature c Fig. 5, may be set in vibration has been
stated above to be by wind. Another mode is shown in Fig. 7, whereby motion can be
imparted to the armature by the human voice or by means of a musical instrument.
126

U.S. I, 78-80 (i888).

PATENTS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSALS

In the last paragraph of his application, Bell claimed "The method of, and
apparatus for, transmitting vocal or other sounds telegraphically, as
herein described, by causing electrical undulations, similar in form to the
vibrations of the air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds, substantially as set forth." 3
There is a very simple reason why Bell may have adopted such a hedging tone in his application: He had never been able, prior to the date of his
application, to transmit speech with his device. (Neither, for that matter,
had Gray.) The famed "Mr. Watson, come here; I want you" was not accomplished until March io, 1876-three days after a patent was issued
on the application of February 14, 1876.
This leads one to wonder why Bell should have applied for a patent
when and as he did-when his lack of success in transmitting speech made
it necessary for him to make his claim in such an ambiguous way. One
possible explanation for Bell's conduct lies, of course, in the fact that he
was aware that others were working in telephony. He knew, for example,
that Gray was also working in the field. In a letter of August 14, 1875,
written to one of his backers, Bell asked: "Don't you think it would be
well to take out a caveat for the use of the magneto-electric current? In
its present undeveloped state, it might be unwise to let Gray know anything about it, unless, indeed, we could secure the principle of it in a
patent. ' '4 There were, and had been for some time, moreover, a number of
other people working on the application of Faraday's principles of electromagnetic induction to the problem of transmitting speech by Wire. One
example of the thinking in the field was published by M. Charles Bourseul
in i854--twenty-two years before Bell's patent was issued. After discussing the applications of Faraday's principle to telegraphy, and speculating
on further phenomena made possible by electro-magnetic induction,
Bourseul went on:
I have asked myself, for example, if the spoken word itself could not be transmitted
by electricity; in a word, if what was spoken in Vienna may not be heard in Paris? The
thing is practicable in this way:
We know that sounds are made by vibrations, and are made sensible to the ear by
the same vibrations, which are reproduced by the intervening medium. But the inten-

sity of the vibrations diminishes very rapidly with the distance; so that even with the
aid of speaking tubes and trumpets, it is impossible to exceed somewhat narrow limits.
Suppose that a man speaks near a movable disk, sufficiently flexible to lose none of the
vibrations of the voice; that this disk alternately makes and breaks the connection
with a battery; you may have at a distance another disk which will simultaneously execute the same vibrations.s
3 Ibid., at 6-14.

4 Printed, ibid., at 218.

s Reprinted, ibid., at 31-2.
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Thus, acquaintance with Gray's work and other developments following
Bourseul may account completely for Bell's haste and the ambiguity of
his application of February i4, 1876.
But Bell and his backers were accused of more sinister conduct. In an
action brought by the Government for annulment of the Bell patents
charges were made that Bell's researches and experiments warranted an
application covering, as his actually stated, only "Improvements in Telegraphy." The Government contended that Bell could not originally have
had reference to a patent covering the transmission of speech, simply because he had never transmitted speech as of the date of his application. It
charged, moreover, that those parts of Bell's application which were held
to cover the art of transmitting speech were not a part of the original application, but were inserted only after employees of the Patent Office illegally revealed to him the methods and objects of Gray's caveat.6 Bell
then proceeded, according to the Government's complaint, "to make substantial amendments of his ....

specification and claims."' 7 And these

amendments, the Government charged, "related to those parts of ....
Bell's alleged invention which he and his assigns have since claimed as the
cardinal element and feature of his patent."8 The Bell patent was issued
on March 7, 1876, just three weeks after his application had arrived in the
Patent Office simultaneously with Gray's caveat. This speed of issuance is
the more remarkable in view of the fact that an interference had been
declared between Bell and Gray. The Government charged, on this score,
that Bell's patent was issued with "undue and unusual haste, and without
proper consideration and in violation of the rights secured by .... Gray,
or of the rights and interests of the citizens of the United States, with respect to the art of telephony .. . ,9
Whether or not these charges were founded in fact is impossible to say;
there is not even a final judicial opinion on the matter, since, while the
charges were made in a formal action by the Government, the case was
never finally adjudicated. Having traveled up and down the judicial
hierarchy on the question of whether the Government has a right to an
action for annulment of a patent, and having hit several other snags on'the
district court level, the case was dropped in i896 -after the disputed
patents had expired and counsel in charge of the Government's case had
died. 0 In fairness to Bell it should be added that the Supreme Court did
6

United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 316-20 (1888).
8
Ibid., at 320.
Ibid.
9Ibid.
10 See the volume published by the American Bell Telephone Company, entitled, The Deposition of Alexander Graham Bell in the Suit Brought by the United States To Annul the Bell
Patents, at p. 2 (igo8).
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pass in The Telephone Cases on part of the charges made by the Government. Presented with some of the charges by private litigants, the Court
held the evidence which tended to support them "not sufficient to brand
Bell and his attorney and the officers of the Patent Office with that infamy
which the charges made against them imply.""
Writers sympathetic with the Bell System have contended that the
Government was prevailed upon, through political influence, to bring the
action for annulment. Mr. Rhodes, for example, stating that the suit was
instigated by the Pan Electric Telephone Company, points out that Pan
Electric's board of directors included two United States Senators and that
its counsel was Attorney General when the action was brought."1 Herbert
N. Casson, paid by A.T.&T. to write The History of the Telephone,' 3 said
in that book that Bell's rivals
next planned to get through politics what they could not get through law; they induced the Government to bring suit for the annulment of the Bell patents. It was a

bold and desperate move, and enabled the promoters of paper companies to sell stock
for several years longer. The whole dispute was re-opened, from Gray to Drawbaugh.
Every battle was re-fought; and in the end, of course, the Government officials
learned that they were being used to pull telephone chestnuts out of the fire. The case
was allowed to die a natural death, and was informally dropped in 1896.14
Although it seems obvious that he has treated the Government's case
cavalierly, it is unnecessary to take issue with Casson. Similarly, Rhodes's
insinuations may be left unrebutted. For present purposes it is necessary,

however, to note that the Government's case was instituted in 1886, two
years before some of the charges in its complaint were rejected by the
Supreme Court, when those charges were brought by private litigants. s
Now, there are at least six reported opinions on one or another aspect
of the Government's case, 6 and, while this ten-year proceeding may have
been a "bold and desperate move," as Casson asserts, the fact remains
that it was made possible and plausible by the inherent character of the
patent system. The queer wording of Bell's application of February 14,
1876, even if it be construed most favorably to Bell, is the type of thing
1126 U.S. I, 570 (i888).
12Rhodes, Beginnings of Telephony 70-75 (1929).
13See Danielian, A.T.&T.: The Story of Industrial Conquest 292-93 (1939).

1 Casson, The History of the Telephone 99-ioo (igio).
ISThie first hearing reported was United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 29 Fed. 17
(D.C., Ohio, i886).
16United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 29 Fed. 17 (D.C., Ohio, i856); same,
30 Fed. 523 (C.C., Mass., 1887); same, 32 Fed. 591 (C.C., Mass. 1887); same, 128 U.S. 315
(i888); same, 39 Fed. 230 (C.C., Mass., 1889); same, 39 Fed. 716 (C.C., Mass., i889).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

inevitably provoked by the patent system's holding out an exclusive reward for'inventions to one inventor. Since technological advance proceeds from the findings of "pure" scientific research, which are available:
to anyone interested, and since there are usually many men working
on the practical application of, known, principles, under the patent system conflict, between inventors similarly engaged is therefore inevitable.
Again, thet character of scientific research and technological application
is such that the problem of carving out a particular development and
labeling it an 'invention for which a patent should be issued, cannot help
creating confusion and conflict. As Bell's experience indicates-regardless
of how it be construed-it is often impossible to predict what developments may accrue from a given process or device. It is no answer to say
that the first applicant should be given a monopoly right to everyconceivable practical application of his device, for that is substantially what
happens under the present patent system; and it is precisely that "solution" which creates the uncertainty, confusion, and, finally, the overwhelming litigation, of which we have had only a small sample thus far in
this investigation of the telephone controversy.
As of i9io,when Casson published his book, he reported that the Telephone Company had been involved in 587 lawsuits, and his comment
thereupon was that its experience was "an unanswerable indictment of
our system of protecting invent6rs."' 7 This comment, like so many in
Casson's book, is important more for what it implies than for what it
states-and again like other statements in the book, it covers over more
facts than it reveals. The comment implies that the patent system has no
trouble establishing inventorship; at least that it had no trouble establishing Bell's. Indeed, Casson seems occupied primarily with allaying any
doubts which might exist or arise concerning the justice of awarding to
Bell the sole and exclusive right in telephony. And his method, common
with such writers, is that "ofrepetition, garlanded with poetry and bare of
fact. According to Casson, Bell was the "original inventor," the"'sole inventor," and the "first cause" of the telephone. "There was no telephone
.until [Bell] made one," Casson asserts.' "He invented it first, and alone."'19
It was only after Bell's telephone achieved popular success that rival
claimants appeared, Casson complains, and "the forgetful public came to
believe that the telephone, like most inventions, was the product of many
'
m inds. 2o
Now the sale (or lease) of the first telephone occurred on May io,
X7 Casson,
18 Ibid.,

The History of the Telephone zoo (igio).,
at io5.
19Ibid., at 107.

20

Ibid., at 78.

PATENTS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSALS

and sometime in the same year Professor A. E. Dolbear, of Tufts
College, copyrighted a book entitled, The Telephone: An Account of the
Phenomena of Electricity, Magnetism, and Sound, as Involved in Its Action,
with Directionsfor Making a Speaking Telephone. In this book, Dolbear
traced the growth of the telephone from widely known principles of electricity, magnetism, and sound. The phenomenon of electro-magnetic induction-which underlies the successful transmission of sound over wiresDolbear pointed out, was made known to the world by Oersted and Faraday. In the 185o's, Helmholtz explored the phenomena of sound. And as
we have seen, Bourseul put Faraday and Helmholtz together in 1854.
Finally, and with a certain measure of inevitability, a German physics
teacher, Philip Reis, reduced Bourseul's conception to a primitive type of
practice in 186i, at least ten years before Bell had even dreamed of transmitting speech over wires.
The case of Reis illustrates the extreme uncertainty inevitable in any
attempt to grant exclusive awards for inventions. One of the defenses to
the infringement suits brought by the Bell people was that the Bell patent
was invalid because his invention constituted only a mechanical advance
over the discoveries of Reis. The following quotations from the majority
opinion of the Supreme Court indicate how nicely balanced the questions
in patent litigation may become. "That Reis knew what had to be done
in order to transmit speech by electricity is very apparent," said Mr.
Chief Justice Waite.2 2 And again-. "He could sing through his apparatus,
but he could not talk,' 23 At this point it should be remembered that Bell
could neither sing nor talk over his device when he applied for a patent on
"new and useful Improvements in Telegraphy. *24The reason for preferring Bell to Reis lay deeper, however, than the mere ability or inability to
transmit speech. As the Court pointed out, Reis had not perceived that
speech could be transmitted only if a constant current were maintained
over the circuit.2s His device operated in an intermittent circuit, which
rendered impossible the transmission of all the delicate vibrations of
speech, whereas Bell's invention consisted in maintaining a constant current and incorporating an armature free at one end to relay the vibrations
21 Ibid., at 52.
1 8 7 7,21

2"The Telephone Cases,

126

U.S.

i, 540

(z888).

2Ibid. Cf. the publications quoted, ibid., at 55-6 et seq.
24 See the opinion of the majority of the court in The Telephone Cases, ibid., at 535. The
fact that Bell had not transmitted speech until after his patent was issued is beyond dispute;
even Casson admits it. See The History of the Telephone 32-3 (19o).
"sSee the opinion of the majority in The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. z,544-45 (i888). Bell

was acquainted with what Reis had done in telephony. See op. cit. supra, note io, at 258-63.
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from the diaphragm to the wire, in the transmitter, or from the wire to the
diaphragm, in the receiver.
In a paper published in i861, fifteen years before Bell's patent was
issued, Reis professed more success in the transmission of speech than Bell
had achieved before his patent was issued: "Hitherto it has not been possible to reproduce the tones of human speech with a distinctness sufficient
for every one," Reis said. "The consonants are for the most part repro-6
duced pretty distinctly, but the vowels as yet not in an equal degree.
So close was Reis to Bell's alleged discovery of the necessity of a dosed
circuit, that upon occasion his device would transmit speech-at least as
well as Bell's had on March io, i876-when it was inadvertently
jammed
or mishandled, thus maintaining a constant current.2 7 And Professor
12

Charles R. Cross, expert witness for the Bell Telephone Company, testified that the Reis instrument could equal the performance of an improved
version of the Bell instrument with no other change than the adjustment
8

of a screw.2

There are other facts which challenge the accuracy of the statement
that Bell was the sole and lone inventor of the telephone. As the title of
Dolbear's book indicates, he had himself produced a telephone (in the
summer of 1876), and it was acknowledged by all as superior to Bell's.
But Dolbear's invention was held to be merely an improvement on Bell's

discovery that a constant current is a prerequisite to the transmission of
speech. Hence, it could be used only if licensed by the Bell Company, and
since the Bell Company extended no licenses to enterprisers who wished to
remain independent, users of the Dolb ear instrument were subject to infringement suit. This accounts for some of the 587 suits in which the Bell
Company was involved prior to igio.
Attention here has been restricted to only a few of the men who had
been working prior to or contemporaneously with Bell on the problems of
telephony. A roll call of some of the men actively engaged in the telephonic field may better convey the extent of the interest in that field. Besides Bell, Reis, Gray, and Dolbear, significant work was done by Edison,
Blake, Phelps, Berliner, McDonough, Varley, and Van der Wyde. For a
more adequate picture of the activity in the field, reference may be had to
volume i26 of the Supreme Court Reports, where a large number of publications dealing with research in telephony before Bell's discovery are
a6See the publication reprinted in 126 U.S. at i9o-9i.
27See MacMeal, The Story of Independent Telephony 7 (1934).
28

See Interrogation 59x and answer, cited in 126 U.S. i, 201; X-Int. i35 et seq. and answers,

ibid., at

202-3.
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either cited or reprinted in part. Acquaintance with these materials and
with the basic contributions of Faraday, Helmholtz, Bourseul, and Reis
makes Casson's statement that Bell invented the telephone "alone" poor
poetry at best.
It remains now to review more material which, in addition to that concerning Reis, renders doubtful Casson's other statement, namely, that
"there was no telephone until Bell made one." This material should illustrate further the inescapable difficulties inherent in the attempt of the
patent system to reward one inventor to the exclusion of all others.
Whether or not Daniel Drawbaugh actually anticipated Bell in the production of a successful telephone, one-sided analysts have distorted the
historical record with respect to both Drawbaugh's character and the
merits of his contention of priority. "The fact about Drawbaugh," says
Casson, "is that he was a mechanic in a country village near Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania. He was ingenious but not inventive; and loved to display
his mechanical skill before the farmers and villagers. He was a subscriber
to The Scientific American; and it had become the fixed habit of his life to
copy other people's inventions and exhibit them as his own. ''2 9 Rhodes
distorts the record by quoting, as a self-characterization by Drawbaugh, a
biographical sketch which had probably been written by an enthusiastic
provincial journalist.' 0 This is the way Rhodes presents the characterization: "Drawbaugh described himself as 'one of the greatest inventive
geniuses of this age, who has spent the greater part of an active life conceiving and producing, as the result of the conceptions of an unusually
fertile brain, a score'of useful, ingenious machines and devices.' ,,3r
With this characterization of Drawbaugh, one may compare that established by the testimony of his neighbors, who described him as sober,
truthful, and industrious.32 And against the charge that Drawbaugh was a
charlatan, which seems to have figured largely in the judicial opinions deciding against him, may be placed the facts that he lived in one community
all his life, counted the governor of the state among his friends, and had no
trouble getting hundreds of members of that community to testify to their
respect and admiration for him.
But what is more important, practically an entire community testified
that they had, at least five years before Bell's invention, either seen, heard
Casson, The History of the Telephone 98 (xg9o).
30 Uncontroverted evidence adduced by Drawbaugh's counsel. See 126 U.S. 1, 359 (r888).
"1Rhodes, Beginnings of Telephony 66 (1929).
2For the facts on Drawbaugh here adduced, see 126 U.S. i, 331 et seq., especially at 339,
356 et seq. None of the actual testimony was controverted. See the arguments of opposing
counsel and the majority and minority opinions in the Supreme Court.
29
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of, or fieard, through, the telephone which Drawbaugh contended he had
,reduced to practice as early as 867. 33 The witnesses were of all classes:
poor and ignorant, well to do and sophisticated. And though the Bell
people had later planted spies in the community, they were unable to find
any evidence of collusion-even though they employed as agents some of
the members of the community. 34 It is impossible to reproduce here the
total effect of the evidence concerning Drawbaugh's claim-for that only
a full reading of the record will do. But the main arguments for and
against Drawbaugh must be adducedin order-to demonstrate the character of the criteria, and the type of analysis made necessary by the patent
system.
One of the main objections to Drawbaugh, as the inventor of the telephone, was that his comparatively thin formal education and the character of his prior inventive efforts made it inherently incredible, to the Bell
lawyers and the deciding judges, that he could have conceived, or, even
more, have executed, such a consummate achievement as the speaking
telephone. As illustrative of the judicial formulation of these objections,
one of the quotations culled by Mr. Rhodes in presenting Drawbaugh's
case to the readers of his book may be set out here:
Drawbaugh .'. . was not only untutored, but he Was isolated by his associations
and occupations from, contact with men of advanced science; he had narrow opportunities for instruction, and few incentives for profound research .... ; he was a tyro
in electrical science, essaying the most difficult work of the electrician. It is almost incredible that the subtle intellectual discoveries which were a closed book to the ablest
electrician' could have been reached by a smatterer in science.3S

The encomia given Bell reveal by way of paradox the inadequacy of
this approach. What Bell had done, says Casson, "was so amazing, so
foolhardy, that no trained electrician could have thought of it. It was 'the
very hardihood of invention.' .... ,,36 Elsewhere Casson speaks of Bell as
having "picked up a smattering of anatomy, music, electricity, and telegraphy."37 As late as 1875, when Bell is said to have completed all but minor

details of his invention, he is reported to have complained, when urged to
develop his ideas: "But I have not got the electrical knowledge that is nec33Between thre and four hundred witnesses testified for Drawbaugh. See the majority
opinion, ibid., at 555.
34 See the uncontroverted evidence adduced in argument. Ibid., at 337-40.
35 Wallace, J., in Amqrican Bell Telephfone Co. v. People's Telephone Co., 22 Fed. 309, 329
(D.C., N.Y., 1884). Quoted in Rhodes, Beginnings of Telephony 66(1929). The deletions in
this quotation are Rhodes's.
36 The History of the Telephone 34-5 (gio).
37 Ibid.,

at i6.
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essary."s8 And again, after he had achieved success: "Had I known more
about electricity, and less about sound, I would never have invented the
telephone. ' 39 The opinion of a contemporary physicist is that Bell "did
not realize what tiny amounts of energy he was planning to control. If he
''
had, he might have been too discouraged to begin. 40
Also relevant here is the observation of Drawbaugh's counsel, who said:
"We believe it can be shown that successful inventors are not the product
of universities."' 4 Among the examples in support of his contention,
counsel cited Michael Faraday, whose formal education began and ended
with a few lectures by Sir Humphrey Davy. Faraday's subsequent experimental researches, according to an English physicist, gave a great deal
of trouble to his more educated contemporaries who "were unable to
avoid mistakes in stating, in what they conceived the more scientific lan4
guage than Faraday's, the phenomena before them." 2
To reach the all or none conclusion required by the patent system, the
courts were forced to disregard or minimize the importance of several
facts which indicate that Drawbaugh's vision may well have been equal to
Bell's. He had access to and read books recounting fundamental discoveries in physics and chemistry, and others showing the applications of
research to useful arts. He was an ingenious fellow. He displayed the poetic frenzy of profound concentration and application, was selflessly generous (and nagged by his wife)-characteristics (except the last) rhythmically displayed in descriptions of Alexander Graham Bell. And prior to i86o
he had, like Faraday, attended a course of lectures by a college professor
of physics, who testified that at that early time Drawbaugh had shown
keen interest in electrical science and had talked of "speaking through
'
a telegraph wire by electricity. 43
This first ground for rejecting Drawbaugh seems an example of juridical "psychology" at its worst. To rest the claim to an invention in any
degree on such a criterion as the "educated vision" of the claimant would
be dangerous even if consistently employed. For "imagination," "vision,"
"conception" are ideas which give even literary philosophers many a painful moment. And yet, if patents are to be issued, and the consequences of
their possession are to remain what they have been, conflicts of great mag38 Ibid.,
39

at 30.

Ibid., at 39.

40 Harrison,

Atoms in Action 47 (i939).

41The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. I 35o (x888).

42 J. Clark Maxwell, Professor of Physics at Cambridge, in Maxwell on Electricity. Cited in
126 U.S. 1, 352. One is reminded of Ben Jonson's patronizing reference to William Shakespeare,

who had small Latin and less Greek.
43 126

U.S. I, 356-57.
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nitude are certain to arise and criteria such as the foregoing must figure
in the disposition of the cases. Indeed, according to the explicit statement
of the Supreme Court, Drawbaugh's failure to measure up to such a criterion was predominantly responsible for its decision against him. Despite
the persuasiveness of Drawbaugh's many witnesses, the Court said his
failure publicly to contest Bell's claim for nearly four years after the world
had known of it was conclusively against his prior inventorship:
We have not overlooked the depositions that have been taken in such large numbers
to show that Drawbaugh was successful ..... They have been studied with care, and
if they contained all the testimony in the case it would be more difficult to reach the
conclusion that Drawbaugh's claim was not sustained. But in our opinion their effect
has been completely overcome by the conduct of Drawbaugh, about which there is no
dispute, from the time of his visit to the Centennial [where Bell's telephone was on exhibition] until he was put forward by the promoters of the People's Company, nearly
four years afterwards, to contest the claims of Bell.44
Such conduct the Court found contrary to human nature: "No man of his
intelligence, with or without the enthusiasm upon the subject which it is
said he possessed, could have remained silent under such circumstances." 45
Yet there was uncontroverted evidence that Drawbaugh had approached
different men for aid in publicizing his invention in 1878. There was a
veritable mountain of evidence th.t people had seen, heard, and talked
through Drawbaugh's device on and off from as early as 1869. He had
6
been ridiculed, and, later, advised that he could not antedate Bell.4
More of Bell's experience is relevant here. His enthusiastic supporters
have deplored the lethargy displayed with respect to his telephone. It lay
on exhibition at the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition t"for more than
six weeks, without attracting the serious attention of 'anyb'dy."47 Indeed,
except for the occurrence of a "marvelous" accident, it might have gone
unnoticed by the commissioners, who had, according to Casson, given it
only blank stares until Bell's friend, the Emperor of Brazil, burst in on the
tableau and enthusiastically drew their attention to it. 48 "This incident in
itself," says Rhodes, "served to direct the attention to Professor Bell and
his exhibit." 49 While this may be more poetry, there is the further fact
that one must "look in vain," as A.T.&T. vice-president John J. Carty
44 Majority opinion, ibid., at 565.
4Sbid., at 562."
46 Ibid. See also, ibid., at 347 et seq.
47 Casson, The

History of the Telephone 37 (Ig0).

48 Ibid., at 37-8.

49Rhodes, Beginnings of Telephony 31

(1929).
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put it, for mention of the Bell Telephone in the two-volume report of the
Centennial. 0° For a year after the Centennial, moreover, the only public
notice Bell got was derisive. "Poor Bell, instead of being applauded was
pelted with a hailstorm of ridicule. He was an 'impostor,' a 'ventriloquist,'
a 'crank who says he can talk through a wire.' ,s" Businessmen called
Bell's telephone a scientific toy. The London Times termed it the "latest
American humbug. ' 'S2 There is the final fact that not a single telephone
was sold for more than a fullyear after Bell received his patent; Bell had
trouble giving them away.53 Is it not possible that a similar reception by
those introduced to Drawbaugh's device, together with a thousand other
possible incidents, could have suppressed its publication? Drawbaugh was
not in the beginning subject, as Bell was, to the pressures of businessmen
who had financed his experiments with the understanding that they
should share in the results. And when businessmen did get hold of Drawbaugh, they gave him plenty of publicity.
Whether or not Drawbaugh anticipated Bell is not important here. The
important point is that determining priority of invention, as the patent
system requires, makes necessary a type of procedure which cannot but
approach arbitrariness. That human beings have a nature, and that it is
in a general way knowable, cannot be denied. But that the detailed possibilities of human conduct can be predicted or assessed on the basis of this
unknown though knowable human nature, seems at present absurd. The
courts essay a bootless job, so far as tenable objectives such as equitable
allocation of rewards for invention are concerned, in attempting to define
either an "invention" or an "inventor." While one may concur in the decision of a given case, the criteria necessarily employed provoke an arbitrariness of analysis which sweeps through all the cases like a strong
midchannel current, and concurrence in the decision of the one case is,
therefore, swept forward to the conclusion that a right decision in the
average case is more or less an accident.
The extent to which the award of letters patent may approach the arbitrary is most forcefully illustrated by the attitude displayed toward
Drawbaugh's witnesses. At bottom, the decision between Bell and Drawbaugh must have rested upon whether or not the latter's witnesses were
believed. Over two hundred people testified that they had seen, heard, or
talked through his instruments. And this is the way District Judge Wallace, quoted at great length by Rhodes, disposed of them:
so Quoted, ibid., at 33.

51Casson, The History of the Telephone 42-3 (I9Xo).
s2 Ibid., and see at 5o-5i.

53 Ibid., at 52-3.
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[The witnesses] have confused the fragmentary and incoherent articulation of such
an apparatus, with the hearing of distinct words and sentences .....
Succinctly stated most favorably for [Drawbaugh and his backers] the case is this:
One hundred witnesses, more or less, testify that on one or more occasions,, which took
place from five'to ten years before, they think they saw this or that device usedas a
talking machine. They are ignorant of the principles and of the mechanical construction of the instruments, but they heard speech through them perfectly well, and through
s
one set of instruments as well as the other 4

The majority of the Supreme Court adopted an even more startling attitude toward the witnesses. In effect it ignored them. It said, as we have
seen, that "their effect has been completely overcome" by Drawbaugh's
unnatural conduct. s5
Though Rhodes quoted from both the district court and the majority
opinion in the Supreme Court, he ignored the dissenting opinion of
Justices Field, Bradley, and Harlan. The following quotations may explain the omission:
We thlnk that Drawbaugli anticipated the invention of Mr. Bell, who, at most, is
not claimed to have invented the speaking telephone prior to June ioth, 1875. We
think that the evidence on this point is so overwhehning, with regard both to the number and character of the witnesses, that it cannot be overcome....
We are satisfied from a very great preponderance of evidence, that Drawbaugh
produced, and exhibited in his shop, as early as 1869, an electrical instrument by which
he transmitted speech, so as to be distinctly heard and understood, by means of a wire
and the employment of'variable resistance to the electrical current....
On the question of time and result, there is such a cloud of witnesses .... that it
seems impossible not to give redence to them. The evidence of some of them may have
been shaken with regard to the time they had in mind; but that of the great majority
was not shaken at all, but corroborated by circumstances which rendered the proof irrefragable. Many of them, it is true, were plain country people; but they heard the
words through the instrument; and that is a matter about which they could not be
mistaken. It did not require science nor learning to understand that. But the witnesses
were not confined to this class. A number of them were people of position in society,
official, professional, and literary,--all, however, like the inventor, regarding the matter more as one of curiosity than of public importance....
It is perfectly natural for the world to take the part of the man' who has already
achieved eminence...... It is regarded as incredible that so great a discovery should.
have been made by the plain mechanic, and not by the eminent scientist and inventor.
Yet the proof amounts to demonstration, from the testimony of Mr. Bell himself, and
his assistant, Watson, that he never transmitted an intelligible word through an electrical instrument, nor proilu~ed any such instrument that would transmit an intell5 4American

Bell Telephone Co. v. People's Telephone Co.,

N.Y. 1884).
ssSupra note 44.
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gible word, until after his patent had been issued; whilst, for years before, Drawbaugh
had talked through his, so that words and sentences had again and again been distinct6
ly heard.S
Thus, of seven Supreme Court Justices, four chose Bell and three refused to brand hundreds of apparently honest witnesses knaves or fools.
For those who are still satisfied with the operation of the patent system,
one may raise this question: Would they feel the sam way if one more of the
Justiceshad bien persuadedby the unshaken testimony of Drawbaugh'switnesses?
Reis could sing through his telephone, and according to a "cloud of
witnesses" Drawbaugh could talk through his; but Bell, who could neither
sing nor talk through his telephone, was preferred. To the exclusion of all
others working in the field, prestige and monopoly rights were given to
Bell. This result, stoutly affirmed as the essence of justice by some persons, is viewed less dogmatically by disinterested persons. "Bell has been
called the Columbus of the telephone advisedly," a recent writer has said,
"for regardless of whether or not others crossed the Atlantic before him,
Columbus gave the world a new continent."57 Alludingto the exclusionary character of the patent system in the context of the telephone controversy, this writer continues:
Such questions of priority frequently arise in scientific fields, as in other fields of
human endeavor; and whenever one individual is mentioned as being responsible for
some accomplishment, it is well to remember that usually there are others whose

claims are almost as great and sometimes greater, yet who, by some twist of fate, have
been deprived of the heroic position which one man can hold, though a battalion cannot."s'

In an address entitled "The Inventors of the Telegraph and Telephone,"
delivered in 189i, Professor Thomas Gray, F.R.S.E., regretted that his
account of the creation of the telephone and telegraph of necessity ignored "a host of important contributors." "To go into detail and do justice to everyone who has contributed," he said, "was an impossibility." 9
The patent system, more rigorous than even the Almighty, chooses only
one. To cast a final doubt at its choice, Elisha Gray, who never relinquished his claim of having anticipated Bell in inventing the telephone,
left this statement among the papers found after his death:
s6The quotations are from the dissenting opinion. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1,57376 (888).
57 Harrison, Atoms in Action 46 (i939).
s'Ibid.
59Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution 639, 657 (1892). See also Bawden, Man's

Physical Universe Sog et seq. (1943).
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The history of the telephone will never be fully written. It is partly hidden away
in twenty or thirty thousand words of testimony and partly lying on the hearts and
consciences of a few whose lips are sealed--some in death and others by a golden clasp
6°
whose grip is even tighter.

The last ten words of Gray's statement take this analysis back to a
more factual base. The individuals we have been preoccupied with were
actually like so many puppets in the litigation; as in a puppet show, the
real business was going on backstage. The most important issue to be decided by the litigation was not which of the alleged inventors was to be
granted priority, but'whether one of the parties litigant was to be allowed
to exclude all others in the production and distribution of telephones. The
parties were corporations; the inventors were financially interested in the
results of the litigation to only an extremely attenuated degree, if at all.
By 1887 Bell's financial interest in the corporation which bore his name
was probably minuscule; he had no interest in its policies.' As Casson
points out, Bell "had done his part, and it now remained for men of different abilities to take up his telephone and adapt it to the uses and conditions of the business world."1'
Men of different abilities also took charge of the contributions of Edison, Gray, and Dolbear. And the "adaptation" is not exactly what Casson

meant to suggest. Western Union bought in the inventions of Edison,
Gray, and Dolbear to wipe out the Bell Telephone Company. For the
telephone was a threat to established telegraph interests, i.e., to Western
Union, a near-monopoly built on patents with a history similar to that of
the telephone patents. But then it came to pass that Western Union was
faced with a more savage competitor in telegraphy; that Bell Telephone
was willing to resist domination; and that Bell Telephone was willing to
agree not to compete with Western Union in telegraphy. So an agreement
between Bell Telephone and Western Urion was formed. Some have
argued that Western Union dropped its attack on the Bell Company simply because the latter's patents were unassailable. 63 This does not fit well
with the promise by the Bell Company to pay Western Union 20 per cent
6o Quoted in MacMeal, The Story of Independent

Telephony

xI

(1934).

61Inthe grand tradition of inventors, Bell seems to have been unmoved by the possibility
of great personal wealth. He owned only ten shares of the 5ooo issued in the first Bell Telephone Company. See Danielian, A.T.&T.: The Story of Industrial Conquest 9,note* (1939).
When that company was reorganized, in 1879, and became the National Bell Telephone Company, Bell was no\ one of its executives; he was carried as "electrician." Ibid., at ix,
note*.
62The History of the Telephone 46 (xg9o).
63 Ibid., at 80-4. Rhodes, Beginnings of Telephony

52-3 (1929).
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of the receipts from all telephone licenses, which Rhodes mentions; 64 nor
does it fit well with the Bell Company's promise to keep out of the telegraph business, 6s which Rhodes does not mention. Danielian, the author of
a fact-based analysis of A.T.&T., saw the settlement between the Bell
Company and Western Union as a subplot of the play in which Western
Union and American Union Telegraph Company were principals, struggling for a monopoly in electrical communications. When Western Union
was certain that American Union could be kept from control of the telephone, and when it was certain, moreover, that the Bell Company would
agree to keep out of the telegraph business, it gave up its claims in
telephony in order to concentrate on its main struggle-the battle with
American 'Union.66 This throws some doubt on the pat explanation that
Western Union was forced to give up its attack simply because of the unquestionable priority and validity of the Bell patents.
The extent to which inventors and inventions may be used merely as
tactical means in the strategy of monopoly is further illustrated by another charge in the Government suit for annulment of the Bell patents.
Among other things, the Government alleged that Dolbear anticipated
one of the Bell inventions and assigned the alleged anticipation to Western
Union.67 When Western Union and the Bell Company settled their differences, the Government contended, "[Western Union] suppressed the fact
as to the said invention of said Dolbear. '' 68 Moreover, "in order further to
suppress the facts, [these companies] caused a collusive interference case
to be begun in the United States Patent Office between said Bell and said
Dolbear, wherein said Dolbear was not represented except in name, and
wherein his assigns, the said Western Union Telegraph Company, the
American Bell Telephone Company and said Bell were the real parties and
were all in one interest.' 69 Dolbear's attorney in this interference, the
Government went on to charge, was "in fact one of the counsel for and in
' 7°
the pay of said American Bell Telephone Company. '
Though these charges were never adjudicated, it is scarcely possible
that they were completely without foundation. Whether or not these
charges were well founded, moreover, is much less important than the
64Rhodes summarizes the agreement between Bell Telephone Company and Western Union
on pp. 52-3.
6s Danielian, op. cit. supra, note 6i, at 42.
66
Ibid., at 41 et seq.
6
7U.S. v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 322 (i888).
69Ibid., at 323.
69Ibid.

70Ibid., at 323-24.
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fact that, the alleged conduct, if it had occurred, would have been a not
uncommon result of the conditions created by the patent system.7 More
important at this point is the fact that inventors and inventions, presumably the primary concern of the patent system, are actually inconsequential in terms of the net effect of the system. So far as the patent
system is concerned, technology is, largely, merely a field on which other
forces play.
The point of the foregoing materials is that the patent system does not
and cannot. achieve, even its immediate purpose. Attempting to,give exclusive rewards to one inventor for one invention, it cannot possibly succeed in a just manner except accidentally, because for all practical purposes there isno such thing as one inventor or one invention. And as the
truth of, this, statement, becomes more evident and the subject matter
more important, the inadequacy and overwhelming social cost of the
patent system grow more apparent.72 At this point the system assumes the
identity which is, from asocial point of view, its most significant one. The
most attractive thing the patent system has to offer is monopoly. Inventors anddinvention, the progress of science and useful arts, become incidental concerns, the promotion of which is lost in the pursuit of other objects-the assumption and maintenance of monopoly power.
Daniel Drawbaugh, simply as an inventor of the telephone, would
probably never -have been heard of by the public. But as a means of
wresting from the Bell Company its monopoly position, he received
plenty of publicity. To promote Drawbaugh simply as another inventor
with important skills' to contribute, the patent system was useless, for
there can be only one inventor interested in a given invention-if the
patent system,works perfectly. But as a countercheck to the Bell interests,
Daniel Drawbaugh.was extremely valuable under the patent systembecause the system cannot be depended upon to work perfectly and there
is always the chance, therefore, that it will work badly in the given case.
The people who got hold of Drawbaugh advertised that their possession
of his invention would "certainly result in the driving out of all telephones
71Practices similar to those chisrged against Western Union and the Bell Company were
proved in the glass container industry. See Part I of this article, 12 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 8o
(i944), especially at note 23.
72With a broader base of scientific knowledge and with more people trained in technology,
simultaneous invention will occur more often than ever, On this trend, see Bichowsky, Industrial Research (1942). A physicist, chemist, inventor, and organizer and director of industrial
research laboratories, Mr. Bichowsky says: "The real danger of loss of an invention to someone else ....is ....due to the fact that in an astonishingly large proportion of cases the
same idea is conceived in different laboratories at the same time. Many important patents
have to fight ten or even fifty interferences among inventors of the same idea, who have filed
patents [applications] usually within a year of the earliest or senior party" (p. 48).
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in the market, save the ones they hold."' 7" The comment of a New York
journal on the projected activities of this company was that "a long and
interesting legal fight is anticipated. 7 4 And, of course, a long, interesting,
and expensive legal fight did ensue.
The result of this fight reflects the result of all patent conflicts-suppression of competition, through either creation of restraints of trade by
industrial combination, or, for especially fortunate combatants, the patent
system's medal of honor: outright monopoly. Having slashed away all inventors but one, the patent system goes on to insure that only one-or, in
effect only one-producer remains in the field.
II
Any one of several of the most important industries in the United
States may be chosen to reveal a development significantly similar to that
of A.T.&T.; it has been common for widespread inventive activity to be
channelized by the patent system into long-run monopoly of production.
In a book published twenty years ago, Mr. Floyd L. Vaughan analyzed
the origin and character of several of our monopolies or near-monopoles. 7s
He found that patent aggregations were a substantial element in their
formation and the critical element in their maintenance. In steel and
wire, shoe machinery, containers, mimeograph equipment, photographic
supplies, oil production and processing, farm machinery, and incandescent
lamps, Mr. Vaughan demonstrated monopolistic organization built upon
patent protection. 6 Concluding this part of his study, he said:
This chapter reveals the extent to which patents have assisted in the formation and
continuation of some of the most objectionable monopolies. The author takes the position that competition in the industrial field promotes economic progress and protects
the people against extortion. It is not the purpose of this study to discuss the evils of
monopoly-high prices, the delimitation of economic opportunity, etc. They represent
an economic cost, and a tremendous one, and therefore a liability in estimating the net
worth of the patent system.77
To say that patents have assisted in the growth of monopolies is a true
statement, but it does not go far enough. The patent system has not only
assisted in the growth of monopolies. It has made them in many cases a
practical necessity.
In the shoe machinery industry, for example, primary responsibility for
73See the newspaper account reprinted in The Telephone Cases, i26 U.S. 1, 549 (1888).
741bid., at 55o.
7sVaughan, Economics of Our Patent System (1925).

76bid., at 74 et seq.

7T1bid., at iox.
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monopoly goes to the patent system. Owing to the widespread character
of inventive activity and the impossibility of clearly defining an invention
for patent purposes, patent rights in the same or closely related aspects of
shoe machinery were held by different parties. None of thelpatentees,
consequently could go into production without risking infringement suits
by others. One of the witnesses for the United Shoe Machinery Company,
in a suit brought against it, testified:
We should hardly have dared to go ahead ....for f~ar of not succeeding in our
patent litigation, or of conflicting with such improvements as Plant had patented. On
the other hand, Plant ....would have hardly dared to go ahead with the possibility
of these infringement suits. These infringement suits, or a good many of them, were
then pending, and certainly he would have found very few customers, I think, for his
niachines.78
To get into production, the company chose to buy up all outstanding
patents, or at least enough to insure impregnability and domination.
When a suit was brought by the Government against the shoe machinery
monopoly, the Supreme Court held in favor of the defendant. The monopoly was regarded as a natural and desirable means of avoiding a patent
deadlock-"a situation familiar in patent law and contests," according to
Mr. justice McKenna.7 9 "It will be seen, therefore," he continued, "that
there was no other way out of the deadlock, if the inventions were to be
used together, ....than by ownership in one hand of all the patents."',,
We know that there are other ways out of a patent deadlock, but as of
Mr. Justice McKenna's time ownership in one hand of all patents, regardless of their origin, was most impressive. The Aluminum Company of
America is another monopoly product of the patent system. Remarkably
similar to A.T.&T.'s, Alcoa's pedigre6 reveals simultaneous and intersecting inventions based again on the common cultural heritage of scientific research. Here the inventions rested on the basic researches of Sir
Humphrey Davy, who is generally accredited with discovery of electrolysis as a method of reducing compounds. Until the 188o's, however, .the
process had not been successfully adapted to the reduction of pure alumina. Then, in 1886, two men independently achieved success and applied
almost simultaneously for patents. The two men were Charles M. Hall of
the United States and Paul L. T. H~roult 6f France. Since the patent system can countenance only one of several independent inventors, either
Hall or H6roult had to lose-to ponder the proposition that the patent
system rewards inventors. The Frenchman lost. With the patent awarded
79United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32, 51 (1918).
79Ibid.

so Ibid.

PATENTS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSALS
to Hall, the Pittsburgh Reduction Company achieved a monopoly in the
production of pure alumina.8'
Again, however, a theretofore unheard of inventor was produced (this
time successfully) to challenge the established monopoly. One Charles S.
Bradley had applied in 1883 for a patent on an electrolytic process for reducing nonconducting metals in general, and alumina in particular, without the use of external heat. For nine years his application lay dormant in
the Patent Office, when, for some little-known reason, it was activated
and a patent issued. By that time, of course, Bradley had only a vicarious
interest in the invention; he had assigned all his rights in metal-reduction
processes to others. Litigation between alleged assignees determined that
those rights had come to rest in the Cowles brothers. They promptly sued
the Pittsburgh Company, and about ten years later, after a contrary
decision in the district court, 82 a circuit court of appeals held the Bradley
patent valid, prior to, and infringed by the Hall patent.83 Some authorities, again confounding the confusion created by the patent system, have
contended that the Bradley patent should never have been issued. Their
charge is that Bradley had never reduced his process to practice, that, like
Bell, he had simply entered a broad claim for every possible use of an unworked theory.8 4 The fact remains, however, that under the decision of
the circuit court of appeals the holders of the Bradley patent could keep
anyone else from using electrolysis as a means of reducing nonconducting
metals.
But this holding did not settle things. Though the Cowleses received a
$3,000,000 judgment against the Pittsburgh Company, neither could
produce pure alumina by the most efficient process then known, without
permission from the other. This mutual frustration was a consequence of
Hall's having patented improvements on what came to be called the
Bradley process. Thus, the Cowleses could produce pure alumina, but they
could not do it most efficiently without a license from the Pittsburgh
Company; the latter could not produce at all without permission from the
Cowleses. The settlement is a matter of history. As Mr. Wallace, author
of a comprehensive study of the aluminum industry, succinctly stated,
"The competition in invention issued in monopoly of production."' -,Mr.
8
1See generally, Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum Industry 4-6, and Appendix B
(1937).
82 Electic Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Pittsburgh Reduction Co., iii Fed.

742

(D.C., N.Y.,

19oi).
s3Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co.-v. Pittsburgh Reduction Co., 125 Fed. 926 (C.C.A.
2d, x9o3).
84 See Wallace, op. cit. supra, note 81, at 536, n. 28.
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Wallace has also given an admirable summary of the final disposition of
the various rights: "Hall and his associates .... remained alone in the
field. The Cowleses .... received a cash award. And Bradley .... received recognition.""
The Bradley patent, applied for in 1883, issued in 1892, and extending
protection against all competition until i9o9, gave the Pittsburgh Company a complete monopoly for at least three years longer than the Hall
patents (issued 1886-89) would have given. Thus the patent system carried Pittsburgh Reduction, as Wallace points out, "past the business boom
(of 19o6-1907 iito the middle of the succeeding depression, and really gave
[it] three extra years in which to become so well fortified against competition that none developed. ''5 7The telephone monopoly enjoyed comparable
benefit from the "seventeen-year" exclusive right granted by the patent
8
system. 8
Time and the patent system have painted the face of monopoly in infinite variety. Most steadfast are the hues heretofore seen. In these cases,
invention, vested interest, or stubbornness were not widespread enough
to make ownership of all patents by one party impossible. To get into
production with the security of a monopoly position, the various parties
in interest found it possible or desirable to unite ownership in one company. But in some cases inventive activity is even more far flung than it
was in the telephone, shoe machinery, or aluminum industries. In some
cases the vested interest in invention is more deeply rooted, moreover, and
interested parties are reluctant to part with a good thing. In such cases
different forms are necessary, though the same effect can be achieved. To
get into production with the benefits of monopoly, when various patent
holders seek to remain in business or it is inconvenient to merge or consolidate, the parties may avail themselves of other devices which the patent system holds out as means of avoiding the frustrating difficulties it has
created. Conflicting patentees may pool or cross-license their patents, retaining the essential characteristics of monopoly. So long as the pool is a
consequence of "legitimate conflicts". created by the Patent Office, its
86 Ibid., at 53 6 -37. Italics added.
87Ibid.
88 The Berliner transmitter patent, an indispensable element in the Bell Telephone monopoly, was applied for in 1877 but not issued until i891, thus extending patent protection for over
thirty years. The transmitter covered by the Berliner patent had been used by the Bell Company since 1878. See United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897). For other examples of prolonged patent protection, see Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise 135 et seq.,
T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 31 (1941).
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members may coordinate their price policies and restrict entrance into the
field. The pool is illegal under the Sherman Act-so far as established
doctrine reveals-only if it was created with the primary purpose of
dominating an industry, and if, moreover, that purpose is realized.8
The leading case on patent pools is usually said to be Standard Oil Co.
(Indiana)et al. v. United States.9" The common phenomena of widespread
inventive activity and conflicting patent rights existed in the oil industry.
An infringement suit had already been begun and several interferences
had been declared. Allegedly to escape the confusion and insecurity created by the patent system, four large companies entered agreements.
"Their sole object," they had asserted, "was to avoid litigation and losses
incident to conflicting patents."9' Under the agreements the cross-licensing
firms pooled royalties received from licenses issued by them. To the charge
of the Government that such pooling of royalties evinced an intention to
obtain a monopoly and was therefore illegal under the Sherman Act, the
Court replied:
This contention is unsound. Such provisions for the division of royalties are not in
themselves conclusive evidence of illegality. Where there are legitimately conflicting
claims or threatened interferences, a settlement by agreement, rather than litigation,
is not precluded by the [Sherman] Act ..... An interchange of patent rights and a di-

vision of royalties according to the value attributed by the parties to their respective
patent claims is frequently necessary if technical advancement is not to be blocked by
threatenedlitigation.92

Thus the patent system, created to stimulate the arts and sciences in a

day when we were even more bereft of them than we are now, actually
makes concentration of industrial power a practical necessity. To produce
at all, these oil companies contended, they had to get together. Getting together meant control of between 6o and go per cent of the production of
s9 No alteration of the generalization given in the text above is required by the recently
decided Hartford-Empire case,-U.S.-(1945) 65 S. Ct. 373 (1945), which held that the purpose of the arrangement there condemned was domination of the glass container industry.
The inadequacy and confusion of this approach is pointed up by the fact that the original
agreement, between Hartford-Fairmont and Corning-Empire, was provoked by apparently
legitimate conflict in the Patent Office. See Part I of this article, 12 Univ. Chi. L. Rev 80, 82
(z9). The Supreme Court does not propose, in the Hartford case, any alteration of the traditional rights of the patentee; indeed, Mr. Justice Roberts was careful to reaffirm those rights.
See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,.65 S.Ct. 373, 395 (i945). For these reasons it is
safe to say that patent-law doctrine, including its uncertainty, is what it was prior to the Hartford case. The only difference now is that patentees who are held, for some reason or other, to
have abused their patents, may expect to be compelled to license those patents at a reasonable royalty.
90 283 U.S. x63 (I93i).

91Ibid., at 168.

9 Ibid., at 171. Italics added.
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cracked gasoline.93 But because their agreement was regarded as a necessary consequence of the frustrating conflicts created by the patent system,
and. because they were'not proved to possess a complete monopoly of
cracked gasoline production, the Supreme Court held their combination
not illegal under the Sherman Act..
:I..
Case after case reveals how the patent system has departed from its express purpose, to serve, instead, the aims of monopoly. The liaison between Westinghouse and General Electric represents an interesting mutation-something between a patent pool and an outright monopoly. General Electric absorbed all its competitors except Westinghouse early, in
this century. Manufacturing an enormous preponderance of the incandescent bulbs used in the United States, these companies share their patents;
prices are fixed in their licensing agreements. These agreements are legal
under, a famous holding of the Supreme Court, which establishes as, one
of the immutable prerogatives of the patentee that of fixing. prices 'at.
which his licensee is to sell the patented product.94 Since they either produce themselves or license the production of almost all the incandescent
bulbs used in the United States, General'Electric and Westinghouse are
for all practical purposes a monopoly-another monopoly produced and,
,I
protected by the patent system. 95
The cases presented to this point sufficiently indicate how the inherent
character of the patent system and its judicially created doctrines assist
and even make necessary monopolistic organization of industry. Needless
to say, few business organizations need extra incentive to seek the security
of- monopoly. Nevertheless, the patent system offers incentives even beyond those hitherto mentioned. Besides encouraging monopoly in the
manner we have already seen, the patent system goads its concentrations
of industrial power to further expansion by exposing them to what appears to be a most vicious danger.
Suppose a completely desirable substitute for the telephone were found
by a person independent of A. T.& T; suppose further that that person
could get impregnable patent protection for his new art; and suppose finally that that person refused to do business with A. T.& T., and refused to
93 The parties to the agreement controlled 55 per cent of total cracking capacity. See ibid.,
at i75. Three of them, however, according to their own statistics, actually produced at least
66 per cent of the total cracked gasoline produced in 9x4.See ibid., at 178, note 17. The Government contended that the primary defendants and their licensees produced 94 per cent of the
total in 1924. Ibid., at i79, note 17.
94See United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
9sFor more information on the General Electric Co. see Kottke, Electrical Technology and
the Public Interest 82-3 passim (1944); Wood, Patents and Antitrust Law 168-72 (1942);
Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise, T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 31 (194i).
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license it in exploiting the new art-perfectly legitimate conduct under
the patent system. Though A.T.&T. might be economically adaptable to
efficient production of the new device, ruthless exploitation by the new
patentee could push A.T.& T. out of business. The consequences would be
staggering. The largest corporation the world has ever seen would be bankrupt. Hundreds of thousands of employees would be thrown out of work.
Six hundred thousand stockholders would emerge with (a) what A.T.& T.
brought in scrap auctions and (b)a strong resentment against their erstwhile management.
There can be little doubt that most corporate executives have been
haunted by such possibilities. There can be no doubt that the conscientious
managers of A.T.& T. have had some bad dreams. The reasonable thing
to do, when faced with such dangers, is to make sure that no possibly competitive art is permitted to develop absolutely independently. This the
managers of patent monopolies have done.
When radio appeared as a threat to the telephone monopoly, A.T.& T.
made sure that it would have a telling part in the future of the new art by
purchasing the extremely important rights in the DeForrest vacuum tube,
an invention indispensable to the successful exploitation of radio. 96 Purchase
of competing patents is one well-established means of maintaining the
monopoly position. Another means to the same end is the creation of an
industrial research laboratory. Dr. William D. Coolidge, director of General Electric's research laboratory, has described the general function of
industrial research. "I think of research as insurance for industry," he
said. When asked, "Insurance against what risk?" Dr. Coolidge replied:
"Any industry is manufacturing certain things. Improvements may be
made by others which would render those things unsalable." Pressed
further with the suggestion, "In other words, insurance against a displacement from its position?" Dr. Coolidge responded: "Yes, that is
97
what I mean."
More detailed statement of a prevailing motive for research is to be
seen in a memorandum written to a fellow A.T.& T. executive by Dr.
Frank B. Jewett, president of the Bell Telephone Laboratories:
While it is obvious that the basic inventions which control a large new field are not
made very often, one can never tell where or when they will crop up. The tremendous
96See Danielian, op. cit. supra, note 61, at 1o2 et seq.
97Thisinterrogation occurred at the T.N.E.C. hearings. See 3 Hearings before the T.N.E.C.

923 (x939). Industrial research, it should not be necessary to add, is, of course, not necessarily
limited to defensive and inhibitory action. In the absence of a patent system, its whole thrust
would be constructive and progressive. But in the presence of the patent system, the constructive aspects must contend, as we shall see, with desiderata totally irrelevant to technological
improvement.
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growth in both fundamental and industrial research in recent years has unquestionably increased the probability of such inventions, with their covering patents, arising.
When such patents do turn up, possession of a strong and unmortgaged patent position
on the part of an industry needing rights is frequently the most powerful and sometimes the only available weapon for securing those rights. Ability to stop the owner of
a fundamental and controlling patent from realizing the full fruits of his patent by the
ownership of necessary secondary patents may easily put one in position to trade where
money alone might be of little value.98

The research aims of Hartford-Empire may be gathered from its "Memorandum on Policy," which reads in part:
In taking out patents we have three main purposes(a) To cover the actual machines which we are putting out, and prevent duplication
of them .....
(b) To block the development of machines which might be constructed by others
for the same purpose as our machines, using alternative means .....
(c) To secure patents on possible improvements of competing machines, so as to
"fence in" those and prevent their reaching an improved stage..... 91

Commending the alert management of Alcoa, Federal District Judge
Caffey pointed out that it had done many intelligent things. "Among the
best of these," he said, "is the establishment of a research organization,
equipment, facilities and staff. On the laboratories alone it has spent
$2,300,000.

°

"100

As defensive measures, mass purchase and production of patents have
served the monopolies in excellent fashion. Its venture into radio produced
a situation highly satisfactory to A.T.& T. "As I look back on it," Dr.
Jewett reminisced, "it seems to me that this enlarged and enhanced position [in radio research] played no small part in enabling us to reach our
present satisfactory understanding with the General Electric Company
and the Radio Corporation of America, and that if we never derive any
other benefit from our work than that which follows the safeguarding of
our wire interests we can look upon the time and money as having been
returned to us many times over."101
9

9 Memorandum for Mr. C. P. Cooper, A.T.&T. vice-president, June 30, 1932. Printed as

Ex. x43 in Part 6, Hearings on S. 702 at 935, 938 (1944),

7 8th

Cong., xst Sess., 1943. On the

relationship of industrial research to the business of A.T.&T. generally, see Danielian, op. cit.
supra, note,6i, at 92 et seq. From his comprehensive study of A.T.&T. (based on F.C.C. hearings, authorized by Congress in 1935, as well as on publications sponsored by the company),
Mr. Dahielian concludes: "Upon detailed examination of motives and techniques, research,
inventions, and patents appear less as sanctified brands of public service and more as weapons
of industrial warfare aiming at monopoly." Ibid., third page of Introduction (unpaginated).
99 Ex. 125, 2 T.N.E.C. 771, 776 (1939).

100 United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 309 (N.Y., I94i).
10,Quoted in Danielian, op. cit. supra, note 6i, at 112.
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Though Hartford-Empire never licensed anyone to the use of its Peiler
air-feeder for the mechanical production of glass containers, the expense
of acquiring the Peiler patent was not, from Hartford-Empire's point of
view, a complete waste. Hartford got no royalties from the patent; but,
possessing it and the financial power to bring infringement suits against
more humble enterprisers, Hartford was in a position to keep other firms
from using any device which might be covered by the patent. Thus its
0
dominance over the glass container industry was strengthened.1 2
Similarly, Alcoa derived no direct returns from its researches into the
fabrication of magnesium, a light metal which is perhaps aluminum's
strongest competitor. But because it held some patents, it was able to do
business with the other holders of magnesium fabrication patents-Dow
Chemical Company and I.G. Farbenindustrie. One consequence of the
agreement between Alcoa, I.G., and Dow was that the last named became
the only American producer, and its production of magnesium was limited
by the terms of the agreement. 03 Another consequence was that the value
of magnesium was not clearly perceived in America until the British shot
down some German planes and found that wide use of magnesium accounted for the lightness and efficiency of their motors. 04 Practically unheard of before the war, magnesium is a highly advertised commodity
now; we are promised a new magnesium world-everything from featherweight flivvers to portable perambulators-by producers whom the war
has freed of patent controls to produce magnesium by the ton instead of
by the pound.
It may be said now that the three "supposes" advanced above and the
danger to established firms there implied, were actually pretty far fetched.
The patent system is in no sense an enemy to the established firm seeking
to maintain its position or to enlarge its scope. When the nature of invention, the character of the patent system, and the facts of industrial life
are considered, the threat to established firms appears puny. The patent
system then reassumes its identity as one of the best friends monopoly has
ever had, and the "threat" it poses may properly be likened to a parental
device for strengthening offspring: The danger is not great enough to harm
and it is just great enough to stimulate activity resulting in more strength
in the monopoly.
The monopoly enters a technological dispute with important ad102

See 2 T.N.E.C. 389-91 (1939).

1OSOn
104

this, see Senate Hearings on S. 2303 at 957 et seq., 77th Cong.,

See, Magnesium by the Ton,

29

Fortune 157 (March, 1944).

2d Sess. (1942).
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vantages. Alone in the field for some years, it has achieved respectable financial strength, coherent management, familiarity with its technology,
and, perhaps most important, a keen knowledge of the ways of the patent
system. The established firm knows that there is no such thing as a complete art'covered by one patented invention. It knows too that an unassailable patent'has never been issued. With a .research laboratory prepared to produce a patentable invention practically at will, and with resources to acquire important patents already issued, that firm is lethargic
indeed which allows a competing art a very great start. Once the firm acquirei 'a patent related to 'the new art, all danger practically vanishes.
-All the fundamental ,weaknesses of the patent system then converge,
paradoxically, to result in enormous strength and added advantages for
the established firm.
The' single and basic difficulty of defining an invention for patent purposes shatters into almost an infinity of difficulties when one considers
that a single'patent never covers a!complete art. A radio set, for example,
comprehends a number of patents or patentable inventions, some "basic,"
some "alternative," some "improvements." In advance oflitigation ino
one can tell just where the boundary lines are. Patent litigation means the
infringement suit, an unfortunate but necessary excrescence of the patent
system,' 5 perhapsthe most expensive of all legal actions and the most unsatisfactory in result because of the basic difficulty of defining an invention. Expense and unpredictability, essential characteristics of the infringement suit, are properties which make it useless to the small firm or
independent inventor; it is too rich for their blood. For the same reasons,
however, the infringement suit is,'as a recent Fortuneartile has 6xplained,
ali efficient weapon for-the powerful firm bent on domination:
Xos The basic difficulty of defining an invention or an inventor for patent purposes makes a
second (or third, or fourth) guess by the courts a necessity. Kottke has explained the situation:
"Most frequently," he says, "it is not the cost of obtaining a patent but the expense of litigat-

ingj it which plays: into the hands of those with ample resources. Yet it would be less than fair
for the courts not to reopen the case. In the ,Patent Office the scales are heavily weighted in
favor of the applicant.,The examiner is not a specialist ia the sense in which the applicant is a
specialist, and he is allotted only a few hours to test an application which the latter may have
taken months to' prepare. The applicant has several appeals, the public none. Members of the
trade are not informed-their only protection lies in the examiner's brief search. If a patent
may put them out of business or divert a good share of their profits it would be unjust to deny
them an opportunity to challenge the contention of the patentee that he first conceived the
technique uponwhich others may have based their business." Electrical Technology and the
Public Interest 39 ('944). The only important thing Kottke has left out is the explanation that
this situation is, for all practical purposes, irremediable. An examiner can never be a specialist
in the sense that the patent applicant is. If the infringement jurisdiction is taken from the
courts, as some persons have suggested, it must be put somewhere. If it is put in the Patent
Qffice, the expense of protecting one's patent would simply be metamorphosed into the expense
of obtaining a patent.
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The most versatile of all devices .... is the infringement suit, one of the most expensive forms of litigation. The infringement suit can be used not only as a simple legal
action" to stop someone from stealing your invention, but also as a controling device
with a range of action all the way from the veiled threat to the punitive war. A competing product, process, or machine is challenged, with or without a clear basis of infringement. If both patents and the patent-owing corporations seem to be of equal
weight, the dispute is likely to be settled out of court with a cross-licensing agreement
between the two. If the challenged company is fairly small, but its patent sound, it is
likely to be forced, in lieu of incurring the expense of trial all the way up to the Supreme Court, to accept a license under the challenger's patent setting rigid price and
production limits. This may continue in endless variations with endless controling results, all the way out to an open reign of terror not only against the alleged infringer
but against all of his customers as contributory infringers. A big corporation, working
from a base containing as many as io,ooo patents, can usually, if it wishes, find &basis
on which to pursue almost any competitor. More lime, vioney, and energy have sonetimes gone into this kind of warfare than ever went into the originaltechnological development.1

6

A.T.& T. discovered the value of the infringement suit early in its
career, as appears from the annual report of its patent attorney for 1892.
"It appears to me," he wrote, "that the policy of bringing suit for infringement on apparatus patents is an excellent one because it keeps the concerns which attempt opposition in a nervous and excited condition since
they never know where the next attack may be made, and since it keeps
them all the time changing their machines and causes them ultimately, in
order that they may not be sued, to adopt inefficient forms of apparatus.,,Io 7

A mere threat of infringement suit by Hartford-Empire was sufficient
to eliminate a small Texas firm whose president said, in explaining the
"voluntary" liquidation: "I realized that we couldn't pay $ioo or $i5o a
day to stay in the federal court. '"x1s Even Hazel-Atlas, a fairly strong firm
in the glass container industry- preferred entering the carel to pouring
more money into the seeoningly bottomless pit of infringement litigation*109
When Dow Chemical Company spurned Alcoa's invitation to enter
upon a career of restricted production, the infringement suit was hauled
out as a means of bringing Dow into line, even though the Alcoa people
had "no definite proof of infringing acts." In 1932 W. D. Keith of Alcoa
,o6 War

and Peace and the Patent System, 26 Fortune io5,

107Quoted

in Danielian, op.
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(Aug., 1942). Italics added.

cit. supra, note 6r, at 98.

108 Testimony of S. A. Coleman, president of Knape-Coleman Glass Co.,
(1939).

-- See Part I of this article, at 86.

2

T.N.E.C. 613

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

wrote to Walter H. Duisberg of Alcoa's subsidiary, Magnesium Development Corporation:
In my mind, the situation is not very complicated. Dow is either going to play with
us or is not going to play with us. If they do not play with us, we have two courses before us. One is to enter into an oral argument over the entire industry with Dow. The
result of this argument would simply be that a great deal of time, paper, and energy
would be wasted to no particular effect. The other course is to sue Dow with two objects in view, the first object being to bring Dow to terms, the second object being to
actually prosecute the suit to its logical end.11o
Unable in the nature of things to perform its stated function of en-

couraging and rewarding inventors, the patent system seems to have undergone a metastasis. Its major utility lying in the coercive power it embodies, the patent system has become a key factor in the progress of industrial regimentation.
III

Out of the chaos created by the patent system, dominant firms wielding
the infringement suit erect a kind of order-"order" imposed by brute
force articulated on the legal content of the patent grant. In aiding the
establishment and maintenance of this "order," the full extent of the departure of the patent system from its ostensible purpose is evident. Even
without continuing patent protection, large' aggregations of industrial
power tend naturally to inhibit technological change.' With patent protection and the tools for domination provided by the patent system, the
naturally inhibitory character of large-scale organization is heightened,
and general inhibition or confusion of inventive processes results. The
essence of the patent is the right to exclude; subordinate essences are the
rights to fix prices and to restrict production, quantity-wise or geographically. Bolstered by these essential rights, individual patentees are in a
position to frustrate the development of a new art, and combining patentees may cartelize substantial portions of both national and international
industries, until the inhibitory character of large-scale organization may

exist even in industries where there is some relatively small-scale production.
The case of beryllium, a vaunted light metal, recapitulates the phylogeny of the patent system-from basic confusion to cartelization. Andrew J. Gahagan, president of the Beryllium Corporation of America,
had at one time thought his firm the pioneer in its field. Upon discovering,
110 Ex. ig, Senate Hearings on S. 23o3 at 1057, 1059, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
" For an account of the obstacles to the introduction ot new procedures in established
businesses, see Bichowsky, Industrial Research ch. v (1942).
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however, that beryllium fabrication had been worked out rather thoroughly and patented by the German firm, Siemens & Halske, Mr. Gahagan
found himself in an uncomfortable position. "I wanted a license under [the
Siemens] patent," he explained, "and [to] license them abroad under any
of our patents abroad, or at least exchange information and co-operate
closely ..... [But] they apparently had no great interest in the beryllium
business I' 2 .... so after about three years I concluded that I wasn't getting anywhere ..... ,,-3 This left Mr. Gahagan in an unsatisfied state.
"I had various conferences with the representatives of Siemens & Halske,"
he went on, "and I couldn't find out whether Metal and Thermit owned
the patents or whether they didn't own them, or whether Siemens were
going into the beryllium business in the United States or whether they
were not going into the business.' ' 4 Mr. Gahagan then revealed the
serious danger to his business that this situation contained:
.... by this time we had spent considerable money and a few years' work; if we
continued the development we might find after five or ten years a lot of overhanging
patents, owned by Siemens, which would be held against us and we would be told some
day, "Well, you can't operate any more," or "you can't make beryllium-copper and
heat treat it .... " and so forth, and the customers we had, or hoped to have in the
future, might also be embarrassed.-s
Beryllium Corporation had two choices: either to go out of business,
thus avoiding the risk of infringement suits by a corporation immeasurably its superior in resources, or to do business with that firm on suitable
terms. Beryllium Corporation and Siemens made a deal. Their agreement
split the world between them, each party granting the other an exclusive
license in its respective territory. Among other things each party agreed
to refrain "from assisting third parties in producing beryllium except subject to the provisions of [the] agreement." Elaborate arrangements for
cross royalties based on "average prices" indicate that rough price-fixing
was probably another object of the agreement."I6
In the absence of patent (or other governmental) protection, a monopoly or cartel faces almost certain long-run disintegration because it cannot
keep out new enterprise attracted by artifically high profits. With patent
protection, however, the cartel's only threat is the possibility of a, successful antitrust suit (in which case we observe the somewhat puzzling spec"2The
German firm seems actually to have been quite interested in the possibilities of
beryllium, and was apparently trying to give Mr. Gahagan the runaround. See 5 T.N.E.C.

2026-7, and Exs. 477-8, ibid., at 2276-8 (1939).

Ibid., at 2025-6.
"X4 Ibid., at 2o38.
15Ibid.
",6 Ex. 481, ibid., at 2279-83. See especially secs. 4, 8-14 of the agreement.
X3
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tacle of governmental sanction, followed by destruction), or a war with
strong and belligerent outsiders (in which case a new, larger, and more
powerful cartel usually results). Thus, over the years, the patent system
has been the best protector as well as builder of monopolies and cartels,
and the varied consequences of its protection have one thing in common:
they are all undesirable in a society seriously concerned with approximating and maintaining traditional ideals of free enterprise and free competiton.
Perusal of government publications, ,Department of Justice releases
and complaints, recent books, and newspaper accounts reveals that cartelization, predicated on patents has developed to an almost incredible
extent." 7 National and international businesses and businessmen have
been tied up by 'elaborate licensing agreements, until the business of production and the business of technological advance have been subordinated
to'the business of maintaining existing arrangements and relative positions.
Inventive activity has not ceased, but it has been harnessed to monopoly,
to the task of dragging "organized" industry through the ruts it has dug.
Productiofn has been stabilized along feudal lines; the traditional independence' of the small-scale enterpriser, if it ever actually existed, exists
no longer in fields where technology is dominant enough to call into play
the full operation of the patent system: For then the small firm exists only
by sufferance. The large firm with its formidable patent structure and the
weapon of the infringement suit is in a position to snuff out any upstart
who cherishes, notions of independence in price or production policies.
Dependent upon the dominant firm for their, existence, and comfortable in the security it provides, subordinate firms have come to delegate
to the leader in an industry the function of strengthening the patent
cartel. The leader insures its dominance, in turn, by inhibiting technological activity on the part of its subordinates. Thus a license from Hartford-Empire usually contained a clause requiring licensees to assign improvements on, patented machines to Hartford.1ys And now, after the
Government has obtained a decree requiring Hartford-Empire to liberalize the terms of its, licenses, some licensees have refused to accept the
more liberal terms. Discussing this problem, Mr. Justice Roberts said:
117Mr. Berge, Assistant Attorney-Gefneral in charge of the Antitrust Division, has said that
"in every cartel arrangement which has come to the attention of the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice technology has been a vital factor." Cartels: Challenge to a Free World
35 (1944). A summary of the outstanding cases may be found in part 6 Hearings on S. 702 at
713 et seq., 78th Cong., ist Sess. (1943). See also Edwards, Economic and Political Aspects of
International Cartels, Monograph No. i, a study made for the Senate Subcommittee on War
Mobilization, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). Ila See Part I of this article, at 9o,note 46.
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"Hartford can be enjoined from enforcing the restrictions [in its licenses]
if that is found necessary. ' 'rr 9 Having adjusted themselves to the paternalism of the dominant firm, these rugged individualists either cannot make
their own way any longer, or they fear the type of reprisal which no court
decree can prevent after the patent system has placed tremendous
strength in one firm, or they are making another stab at maintaining the
cartel, whose comfort the patent system taught them to cherish.
Relatively small businesses in electrical technology are exposed to similar conditions. Firms licensed under General Electric's incandescentlamp patents must promise to license G.E. without further consideration
under all related patents which they own or are privileged to sublicense;
though the licensesfrom G.E. may be for short terms, the licenses to G.E.
are for the life of the patent concerned.Y Obliged to license the strongest
firm in the industry, when that firm is under no similar obligation, the
small company's incentive to invent is probably inhibited, and if the incentive to invent is' not completely inhibited, the incentive to get patent
protection is. For patent protection is an expensive business, and if a
patent once obtained must be made available to a strong firm, which has
no reciprocal obligation, the patent system offers no attraction at all.
Speaking of the operation of the patent system generally, the author of a
recent study of the electrical products industry pointed out that "the
cost and uncertainty of patent litigation greatly impair the value of patents as an incentive, and occasionally they are a deterrent rather than a
stimulus to improvement. ''I2I Small firms working in electrical technol-

ogy, the same author said, "are persuaded, usually after unsatisfactory
experiences with patent litigation, that they would be unable to protect
whatever rights they might obtain...... As a consequence, this writer con'
tinues, "some small concerns no longer apply for patents.'

23

Thus patent strength is concentrated in the dominant firms which then
possess absolute power over what has become, through the agency of the
patent system, a dosed industry. The inevitable consequence is that of
all "dosed shop" arrangements: members of the dosed shop become so
preoccupied with their own immediate security that dynamic productivity, which alone can insure general security, is gradually forgotten. "If a
plausible case of overcapacity [in electrical technology] could be made
out," Kottke predicts, "the industry would countenance denial of licenses
"19 Hartford-Empire
120
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12,Ibid., at 130.
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'
to newcomers, and price maintenance usually would be welcomed. 'I24
The rigid hegemony, structurally and psychologically dependent on patent
protection, therefore creates conditions wherein a recession of business
activity is subject to immediate and far-reaching aggravation. Speedy retrenchment and sticky prices are bound to come when they can be accomplished, in accordance with the already coordinated desires of existing

producers, merely by making legally enforceable adjustments in patent
licenses. The sins of the patent system are manifold.

But the evils created by the patent system do not end with the inhibition of invention and the creation of depression-aggravating cartelization.

The basic futility of attempting to define "an invention" for patent purposes manifests itself again in monstrous confusion when several powerful firms have intersecting operations. In the field of radio, some of the
strongest corporations in the world found themselves, not entirely by
accident of course, in an impenetrable patent tangle.2s Dovetailing and

conflicting patents were held by A.T.& T., General Electric, Westinghouse, United Fruit Company, and others. No firm could produce a good
radio, not because it did not know how, but because the patent system
would have subjected it to the devastating expense ofpatent litigation. The
respective corporations-in-interest were not greatly harmed by the frustration resulting from the basic inadequacy of the patent system; they
were successfully engaged in monopolistic activities in other fields. Only
the new art suffered real harm; its exploitation was set back several years
at least. Indeed, had not the United States Government interceded to

promote a reconciliation for war purposes, the mutual frustration might
have continued much longer than it didY.11 6 The preamble to the pooling
agreement indicates the character of the conflict:
.... each party is in possession of information, patents and inventions applicable
to, and has research organizations engaged in investigations bearing upon, not only its
own business but also the business of the other party; and
.... various patents or applications for patents of the parties are involved in interference with each other in the United States Patent Office;
.... the restrictions upon each party imposed by the patent rights of the other and
the uncertainties arising out of interferences have tended to, and if permitted to continue, will hamper and delay progress in the development and production of wire and
wireless telephone and telegraph apparatus and systems; and
.... the effective and prompt development of the arts in question can be secured
1241bid., at 128-9.

2s5See Danielian, op. cit. supra, note 61, at 107-13; Wood, Patents and Antitrust Law
128-37 (1942).
126See Danielian at iog, et seq. The Government's intercession actually produced only a
temporary compromise.
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only by the free and frank cooperation and exchange of information between the parties, which can not well take place if improvements and knowledge resulting from one
party's cooperation with the other party may without its consent be made available in
its field to the use of others ..... 27

The radio trouble was later mirrored in television, where some of the
same parties were again at odds. Philo T. Farnsworth, inventor of one of
the basic television processes, testified before the T.N.E.C. that television
"has grown up so interwoven that part of the patents belong to RCA,
part belong to us, part belong to Bell Telephone ..... Several of the
fundamental patents are ours and I think several of the fundamental
patents are RCA's also ..... It is not possible to build a television receiver without working under our patent; it is not possible to build a tele1
vision receiver, in my opinion, without working under RCA license.1 12S
If the new art is to be developed at all, under such circumstances, the
parties in interest must combine their patents. Such combination calls
for elaborate agreements, designed to safeguard the interests of the established firms concerned. The tendency in such agreements is to fix the development of the art in accordance with the desires of the dominant bargaining parties. Lines of force are laid with the primary emphasis, not on
the development of the new art, but on the perpetuation of established
strength.129

In a world where change cannot be suppressed, even by the patent system and the elaborate agreements it produces, those agreements do not
necessarily lead to smooth and rapid development of the art they cover;
and, in the case of an art related to but not covered expressly by the subject matter of the agreement, they only heighten the basic confusion and
cumulate the obstructions to technological development. Concrete examples of the obstructions which elaborate agreements cannot eliminate are
presented by the careers of sound-movie equipment and synthetic rubber.
As a consequence of past pooling agreements, A.T.& T. and R.C.A.
found themselves jointly possessed of the basic patents on sound-movie
apparatus. 30 Each was in a position, therefore, to develop the field. Since
their former agreements had not included the situation presented by the
new art, however, obstructions similar to those characterizing the radio
conflict arose, and development of the new art was once again frustrated
127
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while the dominant firms jockeyed for position. A.T.& T. tried every conceivable device to keep R.C.A. out of the sound-movie field, even arguing
that its attempts to keep movie producers from using R.C.A. equipment were motivated by its well-known desire to maintain high standards
of performance. Since R.C.A's equipment was based on the patents used
by A.T.& T., however, and since objective tests indicated that both types
of equipment were equally good, another motivation must have accounted
for A.T.& T.'s conduct. This motive, as appears from a memorandum
written 'byan A.T.& T. official, was no more or less than the constant
motivation to greater monopoly power:
In the talking motion picture field, they [R.C.A.] are competing very actively with
us at present, as you know, to develop an affiliationwith the large motion pictuin pro
ducers and competition'between us will doubtless ultimately result in a situation highly favorable to the motion picture,interests and opposed to our own. This is an extensive and highly profitable field and it is quite worth our while to go a long way toward
making it practically an exclusive field. I believe that we could justify, from a commercial standpoint, paying a large price for the liquidation of the Radio Corporation for
this purpose alone."'
Once again the patent system provided the weapons for the battle. All
the tricks with which the patent system endows its monopoly offspringtying clauses, subtle hints of contributory-infringement suits, "double
royalty" clauses, service-repair-and-replacement provisions, etc.-were
used to discourage, the purchase of R.C.A. equipment. But once again the
only significant consequences of the dispute were delay in the exploitation
of the new art and confusion in its development. R.C.A. finally shared the
field with A.T.& T.
The foregoing situation was simple and innocuous in comparison with
the one recently prevailing in. the synthetic rubber field.132 In this field,
more than in any other, the fallacious assumptions of the patent system
are laid bare, and the consequences of its simple-minded view of inventions and the inventive process show that it cannot be tolerated, if we are
to have unrestricted production and rapid development of new processes.
Here the patent system has worked industry up to a crescendo of confusion, and the consequences in terms of critical wartime shortages are even
more painfully evident than are those in light metals. The scope and char-

acter of the confusion may be conveyed by naming the principal parties
to one of the many major agreements which wartime producti6n of synthetic rubber made necessary. Among the original parties to one of the
T31Quoted, ibid., at 143.,

32See generally, Senate Hearings on S.23o3 at 2621 et seq., 77th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1942)..
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agreements pertaining to the manufacture of butadiene were the Rubber
Reserve Company, Universal Oil Products Company, Standard Oil Development Company and Jasco, Inc., Shell Development Company and
the M. W. Kellogg Company, Humble Oil & Refining Company, Koppers Company and Koppers United Company, Shell Oil Company and
Shell Chemical Company, Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation,
Phillips Petroleum Company and the Lummus Company, Celanese Corporation of America, Standard Oil Company of Louisiana, Hycar Chemical Company and the B. F. Goodrich Company, the Dow Chemical
Company, and the United Gas Improvement Company. This agreement
covered only that part of the synthetic rubber field concerned with the
manufacture of butadiene from butane, butylene, acetaldehyde, ethyl alcohol, propylene and formaldehyde, benzene, and hydrogen, or mixed
gases containing butadiene in recoverable proportions133
To get synthetic rubber into mass production, the national government has had to force a reconciliation between various patentees. Goodrich and Goodyear, for example, companies which had done substantial
research in synthetic rubber, hesitated to do business with Standard Oil,
because the licenses it offered provided for cross-licensing improvements.
They are said to have feared the kind of dominance which Hartford-Empire had secured over the glass-container industry by similar licensing
provisions fortified by tremendous resources and an already powerful
patent position.r3 4 Thus, for fear of the monopoly power so easily constructed on patents, the rapid development of a new and necessary art
was subordinated to other considerations; as ever, the business of production was frustrated by the tactics of monopoly fostered by the patent
system.
Blithely operating on the principle that single inventions are self-sufficient and marketable, the patent system has thus made rapid development of a technologically complex field practically impossible. Its basic
assumptions unfounded, the system necessarily creates confusion and the
possibility of unending obstruction. Fortune Magazine has shown in a
vivid and accurate description what patents have done in a newly exploited art:
Probably the most complex pattern of all is the technically fast-moving oil industry, where a Topsy patent system has grown out of th sheer give and pull of necessity.
13 See The Government's Wartime Research and Development, 194o-44, Report No. 5
from the Subcommittee on War Mobilization to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs
249-50 (1945).

134 See Hearings on

S. 2303 at 2635,

77th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1942).
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Hundreds of patents are issued annually on basic processes, parts of processes, competing products, equipment, techniques, catalysts, and endless improvements on each,
with ownership inextricably mixed among all the major oil producers and development
companies. To operate at all, the industry has spun a nightmare web of licenses,
cross licenses, patent-holding companies, pools, immunities, -and "hold harmless"
devices--so tangled and organic a growth that the forbidding chart on page 1o4 is
probably the first attempt ever made to diagram it. Clearing some new processes out
of the tangle into wide-scale war production in high-octane gasoline, toluene, and
butadiene has had both the industry and government in knots."3

It is often impossible to tell which patents are key patents in a complex and rapidly growing art; hence the holder of any patent, if he has
weight and swings it properly, may block a whole line of development;
and even if no conscious attempt at frustration is made, the mere presence
of conflicting, legally enforceable rights makes for confusion and obstruction. In a developing technology there may be hundreds of important patents to be reckoned with, each representing a hazard to smooth development of the art. Facing such facts, one may well ask with Mr. Alfred E.
Kahn, author of the article, "Fundamental Deficiencies of the American
Patent System": "Can the sweep of modem technology withstand the

restrictive force of a hundred patents covering a hundred minute individ' 6
ual efforts in that growing process we call a 'product'?"'
"The proof that it cannot," Mr. Kahn continues, "is that industry
after industry had been checkmated by the patent law and has been
forced to set aside the individual patent both as a basis for production
and as a stimulus and reward for invention."'' 3 In an attempt to avoid its
frustrating difficulties, various industries (e.g., aircraft, radio, automobile)3 have essayed modifications of the patent system with respect to
their own operations. These industries have eschewed, to some extent, the
essential patent prerogative-the right to exclude-hoping thereby to
minimize the obstructions which thoroughgoing pursuit of the
patent
right creates. Significant as it is for an evaluation of the patent system,
such private and unilateral modification has its limitations. If compulsory
licensing of pooled patents were a well-established doctrine in patent law,
-existing firms might be trusted with the power which charter membership
r3s War and Peace and the Patent System, 26 Fortune 134 (Aug.,
136

1942).

Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent System, 3o Am. Econ. Rev.

475, 482 (194O).
137

Ibid.

138

On aircraft, see Wood, Patents and Antitrust Law 148-5o (1942). On automonites, see

ibid., at 145-8; Kottke, op. cit. supra, note ioS, at
86, 92-3.

17.

On radio, see Wood at 135-7; Kottke at

PATENTS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSALS

in a pool gives them.,- This condition does not exist, however, and the
open pool is consequently subject to the same kind of objection that the
outright cartel evokes. Essentially pre-empting the function of the Patent
Office, a pool controls the destiny of its constituents and the art it governs;
representing the combined strength of the industry, it is subject to the
suspicion which all extragovernmental concentrations of power should
excite.
These considerations aside, there are still other things which militate
against choice of the pool as a satisfactory method of neutralizing the
evils of the patent system. Members of a pool must still cope with the restrictive power latent in the present patent system. Safe from disputes
with fellow-members, the member of a pool still has no guarantee against
disputes with nonmembers. There is no way to avoid such conflicts and
their undesirable consequences as long as the patent system exists, for the
patent system forces itself upon the members of all industries in which
there is technological change. No producer has a choice between taking
or not taking out patents; patents must be acquired, if only for defensive
purposes.
Even members of the automobile industry, which has gone furthest in
renouncing the "protection" of the patent system, find themselves confronted with its difficulties. Thus, in a statement of policy prepared by
patent counsel for General Motors Corporation, it is said:
Neither the Corporation nor any of its subsidiaries ever purchased any patent unless it was felt necessary to do so to protect some article or device, or part thereof, they
intended to manufacture ..... [Patents] were taken out, not because the Corporation
intended to exploit them against its competitors, but to protect itself against persons
who might think of the same thing and obtain a patent thereon and then sue the Corporation for infringement.140

Once in the game, however, all the harassing consequences follow. Though
G. M. professed acquisition of patents only for defense, it was nevertheless involved in 446 interference proceedings between 1922 and r937.'4Y
Possession of patents leads naturally, moreover, to attempts to enforce
the rights they embody, and so General Motors has had its fling at the infringement suit. Unlike other large and well-established firms, however,
G. M. has not found the infringement suit a desirable weapon; "the re139
Fortune Magazine, perceiving the drift, has said: "In the long view .... war and reconstruction and the whole force of modem technology are moving inexorably toward some
form of compulsory licensing, because pools cannot be regulated for the best social and technical ends by any milder reforms." War and Peace and the Patent System, 26 Fortune 138 (Aug.,
1942).
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suits accomplished have not at all: been commensurate with the expense.""12 BetWeen 1924 and 1937, patent litigation cost G. M. about
$3,;oo,ooo.1 43
We have seen that the patent system has not dealt, and probably cannot deal, adequately either with; rewarding inventors or defining invention. We have seen also how the patent system's basically inadequate conception of invention assists and even makes necessary the growth of
monopolistic organization, with its concomitant stifling of invention; how
the patent system places a premium on enormous industrial strength in
other ways, with the consequences that in an important technological
field free enterprise is impossible and patents offer no incentive to any
but the strongest firms, We have seen, finally, how the basic inadequacy
of the patent system's conception of invention has created conditions
which tend to clog the whole process of commercial exploitation of invention. It remains now:to point out a further and perhaps more profoundly
dangerous consequence of the operation of the patent system. Still in
embryo, this vice of the system, "generated on the dung of other vices,"
is nevertheless worthy of observation.
Modern technology is based on fundamental discoveries in the natural
sciences. Disinterested observation and experimentation are probably the
most favorable 'conditions.for scientific research; another important element in the growth of fruitful discovery is the free dissemination of the
products of scientific research., These conditions find approximate realization in those universities which see as their business the finding and
propagation of important facts about nature, man, and society.
Without prb'v'iding an equally appropriate substitute, the patent system tends to weaken the position of the university as the perfect sponsor
of scientific research. The patent system has built monopolies and encouraged them to create vast industrial laboratories; it has endowed them
with the means of expanded research programs by putting them above
the reach of competition. To the extent that it is responsible for the extravagant growth of 'the' industrial research laboratory, the patent system draws men fromi universities, where they are paid to do disinterested
research and-to publish their results, and puts them in industrial laboratories, where their primary function is, or should be, to strengthen the in44
dustrial position of their employer.'
143 Ex. io6, ibid., at 700.
142 Ibid.
144 Dugald C. Jackson, professor of electric power production and distribution at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote in 1932: "It is estimated that there are now in the
neighborhood of thirty thousand research workers directly attached to technological prob-
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The enormous research expenses of the modern industrial giant are
paid for, of course, by the public, and thus the industrial laboratory gets
social support which might otherwise go to the. universities, whose relatively disinterested position makes them more appropriate agencies for
the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge. The private firm is,
and should be, concerned with strengthening its own position; if the
public desires to support the pursuit of knowledge, therefore, its money
is best spent by institutions whose function it is to engage in that pursuit.
To the extent that industrial laboratories depart frompolicies of strengthening themselves in their research, they distort their own function; in a
private-enterprise economy, the business of the private firm is to maximize its own profits. 45 There is no proper place for disinterested research
by private firms in this system, and, their publicized protestations to the
contrary notwithstanding, the chances are that none of our large industrial laboratories is engaged in the sanctified pursuit of truth for .its
X46
own sake.
An even greater danger to the advancement of knowledge is that the
patent system may alter the university's conception of its own function.
lems, and that only about five hundred investigators are supported in the less restricted research of university laboratories and research foundations. The ratio is disquieting. Multiplication of the five hundred is a need. The fertility of industry is likely to wane unless new knowledge may continue forthcoming at a rate which is in suitable keeping with the rate of industrial
application; and unless new means for making the applications are constantly in review." See
the essay by Professor Jackson, The University Laboratory as a Partner of Industry, printed
as ch. ix in Ross (ed.), Profitable Practice in Industrial Research 177 (932).
Industrial research has sometimes called for extremely large budgets. A.T.&T.'s research,
for example, is said to have cost $25oooo,ooO between i96 and 935. In 1939 the Bell Telephone Laboratories alone had 3,669 employees, including x,665 engineers, 273 physicists and
metallurgists, 336 technically trained assistants, 328 draftsmen, and 6o patent solicitors. See
Kottke, Electrical Technology and the Public Interest 52 (i944). Bennett, The American

Patent System'184-6

(x943).

there
B. Jewett, president of the Bell Telphone Laboratories, has said: " ....
is a vital distinction between the university research laboratory and the one which can best
serve industry. This distinction is involved in the motive behind each. It is a distinction so
vital that any serious attempt to transfer the functions of one to the other, or even to make
one serve the functions of both, is more than likely to prove disastrous to each ......
" .... the industrial research laboratory is part of a mercantile machine and its main objective must necessarily be the solution of purely utilitarian problems. In other words, it must
of necessity concern itself essentially in cultivating for profit those regions discovered and
mapped out by the academic experimenters in the fields of the fundamental sciences." In
Ross (ed.), Profitable Practice in Industrial Research 7-8 (1932). See also the essay by L. A.
Hawkins, Executive Engineer in General Electric's Research Laboratory, ibid., at 63, 68
146 "Research in the university and in [for example] the General Electric Company are two
vastly different things; regardless of how much publicity men try to smooth this fact over."
Bichowsky, Industrial Research 93 (1942). "The truth is that there is seldom justification for
an industriallaboratory to work on problems for which an immediate commercial need is not
seen. To work on soap films just for the fun of it or to increase the sum of human knowledge is
not good business or good sense except under certain conditions." Ibid., at x1-2.
145Frank
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Tending to draw science from the universities, the patent system may
"balance things" by inserting itself in the vacuum. The past susceptibility
of the universities to revenue producing possibilities suggests that this
fear is not visionary, and indeed the patent system has already entered
universities. Those universities which pursue or encourage their members
in the pursuit of patents, invite the same departure from disinterested
research which is characteristic of the industrial laboratory. The university professor whose research is oriented in terms of patent protection
inevitably loses the quality of disinterestedness. Research aimed at a
patent necessarily departs from the "basic" level, for discovery of a "nattural principle" is not patentable. Since a patent will not issue for an already published discovery, moreover, pursuit of a patent negates that
other desirable feature of university research, the free dissemination of its
findings.44

When and if universities pursue organized patent programs, there will

be few institutions which pay men to do strictly disinterested research of
a basic character. Under such circumstances there will probably be little
basic research, and a first class irony will then exist. Established to promote the arts and sciences, the patent system, whichi has already frustrated the commercial exploitation of invention, will also have dried up its
48
well-spring.1
147 The conflict between the patent system and publication of the products of research is illustra ed by the following excerpt from a memorandum from the files of the General Electric
Company:
"We do not know exactly what system the Osram Company have in regard to looking over
articles by their employees before publication. As you know, we have in this country a rigid
routine which proN;ides that all articles written by our employees before publication must be
submitted to the Patent Department in order to see that no statements are made which may
affect our patent situation. I presume that the Osram Company has a similar routine. In this
particular instance, there might be a minor complication in that we have our license under the
Schroeder U.S. patent from Krupp. Therefore, it might seem that Krupp should exercise some
sort of censorship also. Primarily, however, it seems to me that the Osram Co. Patent Department should be responsible for looking over articles written by its employees." Lewin Exhibit
No. 70, Senate Hearings on S. 23o3 at 412, 7 7 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
148The need is for attitudes and actions which the patent system frustrates--greater stability, more sensible exploitation, the productivity associated with competition, and broader
and deeper "pure" scientific research. These requirements are antithetical to the present era of
gaudy gadgetry, proceeding from the distortions of all types of productive activity traceable
to the patent system. On this question generally, see the essay written (in collaboration with
L. A. Hawkins) by the renowned Director of Research of the General Electric Company, Mr.
Willis R. Whitney:
"We in America are generally superficial. The lives of a few exceptionally able American
inventors have led us to overprize engineering short cuts. We are patenting inventions at the
rate of nearly 5o,ooo a year, but few Americans are advancing the sciences at all ..... During
the past century there appeared in European countries men who devoted their entire time to
study in fields of new knowledge. Their lives were spent in their laboratories and all that they
learned was freely published. They did not confine their teaching to talks about the works of
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IV

"The business of government," Woodrow Wilson once said, "is to see
that no other organization is as strong as itself; to see that no group of
men, no matter what their private business is, may come into competition
with the authority of society." This corollary of the axiom upon which
representative government is traditionally rationalized, never encounters
a straightforward challenge; but the facts of life reveal that it is often disregarded. We have resoundingly renounced the proposition in practically
every important area of the economy, and instead of government by duly
constituted authority, we have government by private groups--no matter what their business is.
If there is a common ideal underlying the various political and economic theories characteristic of America, it is, stated in the broadest
sense, the ideal of individual self-realization, conditioned by free access
to the resources of society. Since "the individual" means potentially
every individul,achievement of the ideal requires organized action to the
end that opportunity for self-realization remain open to all. Furthermore,
since the existence of society is the condition precedent of self-realization
("success" as we know it is impossible outside society), the criterion of
success in a nonexploitative system must be that of service to the society;
briefly put, "the most of the best (at the cheapest price)." Three entities
are therefore involved-the individual, society, and government. And
the relationship among them may be sketched in this way: for the individual, opportunity; for the society, service; for the government, the job of
maintaining the conditions wherein both the individual and society are
thus served. With specific reference to a largely "private"-enterprise
economy, the ideal requires a government vigilant to maintain freedom
and equality of opportunity for the individual to reach economic success
through efficient service of the public need and desire for material goods.
A long step forward may be taken by adding that this is oly the theory
of free, competitive enterprise, stated in terms which reveal it as simply a
device for serving, simultaneously, the individual and the common good.
The foregoing seems to be a fair statement of the theory of representaothers ..... If we search for a reason why so many scientific pioneers developed in Europe,
rather than in America, we discover that they are the products of a system. Each was freed to
evolve himself and follow his studies along the lines he chose, and he was given the assistance
of students who were at the same time learning the value and rare power of careful thought
and painstaking investigation ..... It is for such reasons that we want to see more chemists
and physicists trained in our schools than are absorbed in our industries. We need them much
more generally in scientific research laboratories, in the college or elsewhere, where the country's future interests are concerned." Profitable Practice in Industrial Research 247-8, 250
(1932).
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tive government and free enterprise. Yet, it takes little insight to recognize that the lawmakers of the United States have not addressed themselves in a workmanlike.manner to the achievement of the ideal., We have
renqunced it to accept government by private grou1ps, and the renuncia
tion has operated, with an almost divine malice, to the detriment of people
in general. It has created vast concentrations of power, encrusted them
with bulwarks which render attack most difficult, and made the 'socially
desirable ideal of free competition within functional groups a dreadful idea
to those groups and almost an excrescence in the eyes of society. By the
delegation of governmental power to private enterprises, furthermore,
that perverse conception has arisen which makes of competition a selfconsuming process, until we find that free competition must inevitably
mean ."no-competition." This is nowhere more clearly expressed than in
the dictum of Mr. justice Holmes:
It is plain from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means combination, and that
the organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever increasing might and
scope of combination. It seems to me futile to set our faces against this tendency.
Whether beneficial on the whole, as I think it, or deirimental, it is inevitable, unless the
fundamental axioms of society'and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be
changed.149
Pushed by the concerted action of interested groups, 'and unresisted
by people impressed with the attitude of Mr. justice Holmes, the tendency
toward combination has enjoyed a veritable heyday. The simple phenomenon of strengthening one's own position, at the expense of both incipient
competitors and society as'a whole, has not only beiitolerated, but lauded, outfitted with the raiment of an inexorable law ofnature, and solemnly
justified on economic grounds as socially desirable because of the efficiency of big business.'5 °
In the important areas of the economy-in tariff regulation, corporation law, labor law, 'fiscal and monetary policy,'patent law-there has
been a great muddle;'SI the Government has failed to establish clear, just
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 , ,i o 8 (i896).
'so Among the assumptions underlying modem society, according to one rather influential
book, are the following: "That large aggregations of capital are not inconsistent with the doctrine of free competition, but are, indeed, inevitable and socially desirable; that the individual
workers must combine in order thereby to achieve the possibility of free competition with concentrated capital. The task of law, whether expressed by judicial decision or newly formulated
by statute, is to accept or reject concretely the implications of these assumptions." Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction 2o4 (i930). Recent trends in labor law indicate that
the implications of these assumptions have been accepted.
Is' The author believes that the distortion and the chaos visible in the patent system are
only symptomatic of an illness manifest in all the cases mentioned in the text, and that the
r49
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rules, within which competitive forces could regulate the nation's industry for the general welfare.152 This neglect of even the minimum responsibility placed upon government by the wisdom of laissez faire has bred
chaos; and from chaos, enormous aggregates of financial, industrial, and
political strength have emerged to dominate the scene and thus to compete with and often to vanquish the authority of society. Meanwhile; in
industries where no giants have developed, moderate-sized firms, uninhibited by any thorough-going attempt by the Government to maintain
competitive conditions, have erected petty cartels in order to escape the
rigors of competition. Where it is impossible to keep out new investment;
basic evil is not one that defies understanding. The basic evil is that different individuals have
used government to further their own immediate ends, regardless of social consequences. Thus,
the power of government has been encouraged and courted, at times, by the same people who
have taken the general position that the role of government should be a "minor" one. This it
most evident in the case of tariffs, the abolition of which is still opposed by the National Association of Manufacturers. In the labor field, likewise, since the nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury antipathy has disappeared, and since there are now concentrations of labor power
analogous to those of capital, at least one spokesman for the National Association of Manufacturers has courted the national power, seeking stringent regulation of labor activity. See
the address by H. W. Prentis, Jr., Government's Place in Postwar Labor-Management Relations (1944), printed by the N.A.M.
The stand against governmental action in the field of corporations has been more unequivocal, and successful. The function of governing corporations has been delegated to the individual states; they in turn have delegated the function to the interested corporations; and thus
the corporation has become a law unto itself. Corporate structures have consequently become
so vast and intricate, and corporate finance so esoteric, that only a few people can comprehend
their significance. These people are usually in control-control so far removed from either equitable ownership or productive activity, that monstrous bureaucracies are necessary for any
kind of operation at all. This is the result of maintaining a healthy simplicity in government.
The same general phenomenon and its effects on the monetary system have been described
by Economics Professor Henry C. Simons of the University of Chicago, who, casting about to
describe the worst possible monetary system, in terms of the conditions necessary to free industry for its job of efficient production, found himself practically describing the status quo:
"Tolerable functioning of a free-enterprise system presupposes effective performance of a
fundamental function of government, namely, regulation of the circulating medium (money).
We should characterize as insane a governmental policy of alternately expanding rapidly and
contracting precipitously the quantity of paper currency in circulation-as a malevolent dictator easily could do, first issuing currency to cover fiscal deficits, and then retiring currency
from surplus revenues. Yet that is essentially the kind of monetary policy which actually obtains, by virtue of usurpation by private institutions (deposit banks) of the basic state function of providing the medium of circulation (and of private "cash" reserves). It is no exaggeration to say that the major proximate factor in the present crisis is commercial banking. This
is not to say that private bankers are to blame for our plight; they have only played the game
(and not so unfairly, on the whole) under the preposterous rules laid down by governmentsrules which mean evasion or repudiation by governments of one of their crucial responsibilities." Simons, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire, Public Policy Pamphlet No. 15 at i4-i5
(University of Chicago Press, 1934).
's-The argument here, and through this section, leans heavily on Professor Simons' essay,
A Positive Program for Laissez Faire (1934), which is the most compact of the clear-cut statements of traditional liberal principles and policies available. See also, the same author's Postwar Economic Policy: Some Traditional Liberal Proposals, 33 Am. Econ. Rev. 431 (1943).
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which is always attracted by the highprofits of the cartel members, capital
equipment is squandered and both producers and consumers suffer.1' 3
Where patent, or other governmental, protection is available to keep out
34
competitors, only consumers suffer.
The disastrous results of the "do-nothing" policy in government are
evident: whereas our ideals are oriented in terms of individualism and the
common good, our practice has tended toward industrial collectivism,
which is necessarily exploitative in its quest for monopoly profits and impregnability to disturbances elsewhere in the economy. We have made the
Hobbesian analysis irrelevant by remaining in a state of nature. Life in
this society remains too largely a struggle of naked force against naked
force, for recognition and success to accompany performance in accordance with social or civilized standards of excellence. Victory is too often
the prize, not of the most excellent, as defined by tenable civilized criteria,
but of the most organized and, indeed, the most unscrupulous. The criterion of success has become, not productive efficiency in free and impersonal competition with equals or near equals, but efficiency in the tactics
of combination. And while we delegate authority and responsibility to one
group of men, we allow other groups, with neither authority nor responsibility, to carry on, in a practically lawless fashion, the most thoroughgoing and intimate regimentation of our lives.
Industrial collectivism tends to inhibit the enterprise and ingenuity
which competition fosters, makes possible a regime of administered prices,
and interferes with the equal allocation of resources which competition,
guided as it is by consumer demand, tends naturally to achieve. Most disastrous of all, because of its inherently exploitative character, industrial
collectivism makes detailed governmental regulation necessary in any
society whose government is responsive to gross inequities. Now, there are
enormous waste and imponderable problems involved in supervision by
the government of the details of private enterprise. Experience with railroads and utilities indicates that such regulation is doomed to futility.

Evidence introduced at a recent congressional hearing, for example,
shows that attempts by the Interstate Commerce Commission to induce
railroads to equip themselves with improved safety devices were futile.
And in the same hearing testimony was submitted which indicates that
rate regulation by the I.C.C. is a chimera:
ZS3Competent economists have long stated that the restrictive practices of combinations in
restraint of trade are "self-frustrating devices, which not only destroy productive power, but
also destroy the social security which it is their avowed object to ensure." Fisher, A Liberal
New Order, io Economica 176 (1943).
,s4 Simons. on. cit. supra. note I<2. at 8-o.
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A rate bureau, or .... rate conference, is a strictly private organization of carriers
for the purpose of considering and agreeing on rates to be charged. As of the beginning
of 1942, there were approximately 6o rate bureaus .... in the railroad field, and 157 in
the motor carrier field. These bureau or conference rates are filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission and with appropriate State commissions. The rates so filed are
published by the bureaus and become effective automatically unless proceedings are
instituted to suspend and investigate them.
Our studies show that less than i per cent of the rates so fixed and filed witk the Interstate Commerce Commission are suspended and investigated.....
As a mechanical matter I suppose it would be almost impossible to have separate
hearings and findings by the Commission on all of those ['thousands and thousands
of different rates'] ..... It is not done and the rates are filed, and if they are properly
filed they become lawful rates.ns

Provoked by the waste and futility of detailed regulation, society's next
step naturally becomes that of ownership and operation by the Government of the means of production. Thus the resentment of private enterprisers and "rugged collectivists" toward any action by the Government
may lead to the elimination of all private enterprise. "A retreat from governmental intervention," says Mr. Leo Cherne, executive secretary of
the Research Institute of America, "may prove to be a retreat into full
governmental domination, into a completely predigested way of life.
There is good reason to fear this outcome. Government has an unavoidable role to perform in a community; it is a reality which cannot be escaped. Denial of that reality by itself multiplies the problems which with
each day's delay, compel more aggressive action by the government."
Such is the map of the future projected from the standpoint of industrial concentration and collectivism. On the other hand, decentralized,
competitive enterprise promises a more attractive future in terms of human freedom and dignity. Permitted to operate within a coherent framework of laws and a stable, or at least intelligible, monetary system, competitive enterprise should equal the productivity of even the most regimented system. And at the same time, because of the self-regulatory character of competition, a competitive enterprise system would safeguard the
distinction between political and economic functions, with the concomitant of maximum human freedom in society which that distinction has
tended to approximate in the past and promises more fully in the future.
It is no wonder, then, that economic analysts seriously concerned with
the preservation of democracy and the strengthening of the free enterprise system, place first on the list of their reforms the prevention or eradication of private monopoly and the deliberate enforcement of competi"s Testimony of Wendell Berge, Part 12 Hearing on S.
(1944). Italics added.
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tion in the largest area of the economy. "Thus," says Professor Simons,
and the emphasis is his, "the great enemy of democracy is monopoly, il all
its.forms: kigantic corporations, trade associations; and other agencies for
price control, 'trade unions-o0r, in general, organization and concentration of power within functional groups." And again,; "Te case for a liberal-conservative policy must stand or fall on:the first proposal, abolition
of private monopoly; for it is the sine qua non of any such policy .....
It implies that every industry should 'beeither effectively competitive or
soialized.x
6
The najor ideas in theforegoing analysis may be summarized as folloWs: (i) The "do-nothing" attitude toward the function of government
is a fraud which either wastes the organized power of society or channelizes it into a socially undesirable course. (2) The' basic evil in the economy
is monol oly'p6wer, with its junior exponents, combinations in restraint
of trade. (3)Instead of fostering concentration, governmental policy
should'be directed toward making competition effective Wherever possible.
The relevance of thii discussion to the subject ot patent retorm lies in
the fact that the case for reform of the patent system is 'largely the case
for rendering competition more effective. Patents are'what may be called
a matter of pan-industry concern; the effects of the patent'system are felt
in every area of the economy; it spreads lines across industries and down
through industries, from giant firms to pygmies and even to small consumer outlets. Spreading as it does, furthermore, the patent system also
serves as a communications line over which the most attractive opportunities for the imposition of industial hegemony may by relayed. Becauseit shows the way to really effective and even "legal!" cbmbinations,
the patent system is a well-nigh irresistible invitation- to contracts in restraint 'of trade, to the satisfaction of the yearning for industrial "coherence," and to the eliminationof such bad things as price'wars and "unfair
competition." 'Finally, and perhaps most important from a long-run point
of view, the patent system operates to make possible and to encourage
bigness in "gingle" concerns, to create one or a few giants in an industry,
and thus to place physical, p6litical, and psychological obstacles in the
path of any program aimed at promoting competition. For once an industrial giant is created, with its elaborate' organization, and its grip on the
public mind, cemented by public relations departments rivaifg' those of
the Army and Navy, the job of inducing competiti6n in that industry be1s6
Simons, op.

cit. supra, note

152, at 4.
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comes enormous. If we are seriously to pursue a program of making competition more effective, therefore, it is clear that something must be done
with the patent system.
V

Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the patent system's general
inadequacy is that everyone acquainted with it has complained about
some aspect of its operation, and all sorts of proposals for reform have
been submitted over the years.
Independent inventors, including some of the most noted in our history,
have registered formal objection to the inequality of bargaining power encouraged by our do-nothing system which has been, in the long run, a
"system" for promoting concentrations of power and inhibition of social
utilization of technological improvements. As long ago as 1912, Thomas
Alva Edison testified at a congressional hearing that "the long delays and
enormous costs incident to the ptocedure of the courts have been seized
upon by capitalists to enable them to acquire inventions for nominal
sums."15 7 A few years later, the Inventors Guild had this to say:
It is a well known fact that modern trade combinations tend strongly toward constancy of processes and products, and by their very nature are opposed to new processes and new products originated by independent inventors, and hence tend to restrain competition in the development and sale of patents and patent rights; and consequently tend to discourage independent creative thought, to the great detriment of
the nation.ss
When it is remembered that the patent system is one of the most important means of creating the "modem trade combinations" of which the Inventors Guild complains, its statement assumes the character of a complaint against the patent system.

More recently, a contemporary inventor has stated in effect that the
patent system has choked itself; that the process of acquiring a patent or
of exploiting an invention has become simply too much for an individual
inventor. "It is hardly to be wondered at," this inventor concluded, in a
long letter to the I'ew Fork Times, "that under such conditions an inventor is likely to think three or four times before going to the expense
and trouble of applying for a patent here."' I 9
'57 The

Oldfield Hearings of ig12. Quoted in Vaughan, Economics of Our Patent System

72 (1925).

xS Quoted in Vaughan, Suppression and Non-working of Patents, 9 Am. Econ. Rev. 693
(1919).

159 Ivor B. Yassin, who had in 1937 invented a structure analogous to the presently publicized Bailey Bridge, was the writer. New York Times, p. 14, col. 6 (Nov. x7, 1944).
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Despite such objections, however, most complainants contend that
there is nothing radically wrong with the basic conception of a patent
system; and procedural changes are usually all they propose. Before the
T.N.E.C., for example, Mr. Charles B. Sawyer, president of the Brush
Beryllium Co., pointed up what seems to be an extensive and irremediable
defect of any patent system. He contended that too often patent applicants gain protection in areas so broad that fellow workers in the same or
related fields are obliged to subordinate themselves unduly to the first
patentee. The first patentee, he complained, often acquires a controlling
power out of all proportion to the character of his contribution. 6 ° And yet,
Mr. Sawyer saw no reason for any radical change in the patent system.
The most desirable cure, to his mind, lay simply in increasing the staff of
the Patent Office. It should be added here that Mr. Sawyer readily confessed that he had not thought much about the problems of patent agreements in restraint of trade, of monopoly, or of cartelization. Pressed on
the matter of international agreements dividing territories, he said: "That
is a subject on which I am sorry that I am not prepared to speak." But
though his business' was endangered by the cartel agreement between
Siemens & Halske and the American Beryllium Company, Mr. Sawyer
thought cartels "not necessarily bad."''
PROPOSALS OF THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION

Arising from a similar approval of the basic conception of the patent
system are the reforms proposed by the National Patent Planning Commission, an organization composed of several-well known technologists
and business executives, headed by Dr. Charles F. Kettering, vice-president of General Motors Corporation. The N.P.P.C.,'which stated in its
first report that the patent system "has accomplished all that the framers
of the Constitution intended," put forth only two proposals even faintly
resembling reforms: proposals for a uniform objective test of patentability
6
and a single court of patent appeals.' '
The proposal for an "objective" test of patentability arises from the
perpetual difficulty of deciding when an invention has been made and
whether it merits patent protection. This difficulty is currently manifested
in the dispute between the "flash of genius" criterion of invention and
patentability, on the one hand, and the "measurable" or "objective" cix6o

5

T.N.E.C. 2140.

61Ibid., at 2142.
16,Report of the National Patent Planning Commission (i943). This report may be found
in Appendix 20 of Barnett, Patent Property and the Anti-monopoly Laws (1943).
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tenion, on the other. 6 s The first of these approaches would restrict the
award of patents to cases in which the judge (or patent examiner) thought
the contribution offered was the product of a creative leap of the imagination; the latter would allow the grant of a patent in those cases in which
judge or examiner thought the applicant had created something new, something which represented a "measurable" advance over the former state of
the art. Except for the fact that the dispute over the two criteria has
caused a good deal of solemn argument, one might be inclined to dismiss
it as absurd. For the crucial variable in deciding patentability is not the
verbal test, but the attitude of the judge toward invention-whether he
is "easy" toward applicants or enamored of gadgetry, or whether he is
"tough" or aware of the restrictive possibilities of patents. Whether the
"flash" test or the "objective" test is used actually would seem to make
little difference; both are merely similar ways of saying the same vague
thing, viz., that the judge or examiner has the duty of examining various
devices with the object of deciding whether the applicant is to get a patent. Though the objective test will serve one purpose, which will be dealt
with presently, it seems to offer little in the way of reform of the patent
system.
The second proposal of the N.P.P.C. is that of a single court of patent
appeals. Besides the fact that not even all the admirers of the patent system can agree to this proposal, 64 it seems sterile on other grounds. The
ordinary judge does, of course, have to work pretty hard to understand the
problems posed by the patent system. Other things remaining equal, time
might be saved, therefore, if a specially trained body were given exclusive
jurisdiction over awarding patents and determining their technological
scope. But other things do not remain equal. The problems posed by patent litigation are not exclusively or even predominantly scientific, technical, or technological problems. In some suits, indeed, these problems
may even be relatively unimportant. Issues of priority, anticipation, and
rough psychology usually predominate; strictly legal problems such as
validity and scope of assignments and weight and admissibility of evidence are common elements. This is largely true, also, of interference proceedings and of the court procedures when appeals are taken by patent
applicants from unfavorable decisions of the Patent Office.
The basic problems in patent litigation on this level are whether a pat1 See Richard, Standards of Invention in the Patent Office, 27 J.P.O.S.

24

(Jan., 1945).

164For a strongly stated argument, by an admirer of the patent system, against his proposal, see the article by the Honorable John J. Parker, Senior Circuit Judge of the Fourth
Circuit, Recurrence to Fundamentals, 27 J.P.O.S. 12, 2X-3 (Jan., 1945).
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ent should be granted and who should get it. Understanding of the t4chnological factsis not impossible, but only difficult, for common-law judges,
and no more difficult than understanding of legal doctrine is for technologically trained men. The effective difference between special and ordinary courts blurs still morewhen one-considers that not even technologically 'trained. men can be familiar with all the technological p~oblem
raised in patent litigation. By definition, "new" things are involved in
such cases. Merely to substitute specially trained men of one group for
those of another, therefore, would probably iot settle the patent pr'oblems created even on ,this level. At bottom a value judgment is involved.
The question is whether the device, offered is new and useful. Good judgment is the basic desideratum in such a case, and no one has argued that
technologists have a monopoly on good judgment.
: The proposal for a single court of patent appeals does promise, however, more.consistency-in decisions and perhaps more speed in the determination of disputei. As such, it would be desirable, if speed and consistency were ends'in themselves. But it seemsunprofitable to commend proposals which overlook, as those of the N.P.P.C. do, the abiding difficulties
in any attempt to grant exclusive rights in inventions. The point has been
emphasized here that the patent system attempts too much. Viewing invention in an essentially artificial light, the patent system has set itself
impossible tasks, and it is from the inevitable frustration inherent in any
attempt to 'do the impossible that the glaring evils of the patent system result. These evils the propogals of the N.P.P.C. make no attempt to minimize or combat.
The basic fliw-in any'patent system results from its attempt to establish a dosed category in a dynamic, multidimensional continuum-to
carve out, an area of thought and give it to one individual. It is this fact
about invention *vhibh, more clearly than any other, distinguishes the socalled propefty in -patents from other, more perceptible and definable,
property rights, Again, it is this fact which makes widespread conflict
inevitable; 'for individuals must inevitably wander into the same area of
thought. And when they do, the patent system commands them to fight,
for, the game is winner take all.
This basic deficiency of any patent system has long been recognized,
as is to be seen by its trbatment in the interesting address given before the
Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, in the 186o's, by one J. Stirling. (The
address is reprinted here in an appendix. 6 ') Undiscriminating advocates

x6s The only other place that Mr. Stirling's address can be found, to my knowledge, is in
the volumd entitled, Recent Discussions on the Abolition of Patents for Inventions 1 16 (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer, i869). '
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of the patent system still bear down hard on the argument that a patent
is like a man's house; they imply that to give up patent protection would
border upon physical expropriation.,66 Some of Mr. Stirling's observations
should be sufficient to silence those arguments:
Patent-right cannot be defended on the ground of justice.
The object of a Patent-Law is to establish a "property in ideas:" but this involves
the double fallacy that thought can and should be appropriated. The end of all law is
to enstiie the universal freedom of human action. Hence the law of property secures
to every man the product of his own labour. It gives to each an exclusive right to the
material embodiment of his productive energy, to be possessed or alienated by him
at will. But in so doing it leaves unrestricted the productive energy of every other man.
The freedom of one (as represented by his property) is thus consistent with the freedom of all.
But thought cannot be appropriated. In thought there is no material product to be
made the object of a proprietary right. There is no "thing" to be possessed or alienated. The law can only, therefore, give the exclusive use of an idea to one person by
injuriously limiting the intellectual activity of all others.-A Patent-right, therefore,
is less a "property in ideas" than a monopoly of thought.

The important consideration at this point is that it is impossible to define any invention without, as Mr. Stirling pointed out, slicing into the
continuum of thought. If thought be regarded as an undefined area, it'is

clear that individuals must wander and have wandered into the same'r&gion, unaware that through the offices of the patent system it has been
pre-empted. It is not possible to put up signposts in' this continuum,
warning off trespassers. And even if it were, it would seem undesirable to
do so. Nevertheless, the patent system has made the attempt, and its
only ascertainable product has been tremendous conflict, whiqh only the
strongest, not in productive or inventive excellence,' but in financial and
attendant resources, can survive. The end result is an economy strung
with monopolies and cartels.
The things which the N.P.P.C. proposals will not or cannot do having

been pointed out, it remains now to consider what those proposals will
do. Both proposals would accomplish one thing at least: they would erase
the influence on the patent system of the United States Court of Appeals
for Washington, D.C. That court now shares jurisdiction with the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals over appeals taken by disappointed patent
applicants from adverse decisions in the Patent Office; in such cases, that
court has adopted a criterion of patentability which differs, as much as
such criteria can, from the "objective" test proposed by the N.P.P.C.
In decisions which have called down the wrath of the patent bar, the
166 Every conceivable argument in support of the patent system can be found in either the
text or the appendices of Barnett, Patent Property and the Anti-monopoly Laws (r943).
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Washington, D.C., Court of Appeals has attempted to bring the patent
67
system into accord with the Constitutional terms upon which it is based.'
The court has taken judicial notice of the facts of industrial life, and doing
so has found that in the modem industrial laboratory a "complete invention" by a single inventor (a) seldom occurs, and (b) would indeed be inconsistent with the processes of research and development perfected in
those laboratories. There can be little doubt that these findings are valid.
Besides the evidence cited by the court, 68 the statements of an experienced
industrial researcher are enlightening on the point. In a book addressed to
industrial research managers, Mr. F. Russell Bichowsky instructs his
readers on the relationship of industrial research to the patent system.
"There is a delightful legal fiction," he says, "that conception of an idea is
a single act to which a date can be put, and proven, but in reality, ideas
sort of creep up on one. However, if a patent is to be obtained and protected, one must furnish the patent attorney with a written record, signed,
witnessed by others and explained to others, stating that A on the date B
invented C. It takes both humor and experience to appreciate the absurdities and trouble this simple sounding requirement can cause." Mr. Bichowsky then says: "Usually there really isn't an inventor. A conception of
idea usually requires the copulation of at least two minds. Who in this
'' z
case is the inventor? 69
The Washington court has also noted that patents offer little or no incentive to employees of industrial research laboratories, because a common custom of those laboratories is to require assignment of all patents
obtained by their employees. And particular recognition of a single employee is avoided, moreover, because of the possible harm to the morale
of his co-workers.170 Again, statements made by Mr. Bichowsky are relevant:
.... it is promotions and special awards which wreck laboratories.
The best procedure [for rewarding technological contributions] .. . . involves paying to the laboratory, for distribution among the personnel, a lump sum as a bonus in
proportion to the wealth created. This is distributed so that all in the laboratory, even
secretaries and janitors profit-those most responsible profiting proportionately.'7
See, especially, the two Potts v. Coe cases, 14o F. 2d 471 (App. D.C., 944), and 145 F.
(App. D.C., 1944).
168See 145 F. 2d 27, 28, et seq.
169Bichowsky, Industrial Research 82-3 (1942). See also, Profitable Practice in Industrial
Research 87-8 (1932).
170 See 140 F. 2d 471, 475, et seq.; 145 F. 2d 27, 29, et seq.
17, Bichowsky, Industrial Research 116-7 (1942). "Large bonuses for inventions are fatal
errors, conducive to jealousy and immediately destructive to teamwork. Practically, in a
z67
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The patent system is based on a theory of individual rewards to individual inventors for individual inventions. Placing the facts about invention in the industrial laboratory against this theory, one cannot sensibly
say that facts and theory coincide. As Mr. Bichowsky points out, fictions
are necessary to give shape to the essential unreality of the situation. A
realistic court might justifiably deny a patent, therefore, on any product
of the industrial research laboratory. But the Washington court has not
gone that far. It has simply placed with the patent applicant the burden
of proving that there was an individual inventive advance over the level
72
of the art then existing in the given laboratory.?
This approach certainly poses no insuperable obstacles to the mass aggregation of patents by industrial laboratories; it may, indeed, as Mr.
Bichowsky's book indicates, merely add another detail in the work of the
industrial laboratories; in addition, the Patent Office favors, and contends that it is bound by, the criterion of patentability established by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and that criterion draws no dis73
tinction between applicants from an industrial laboratory and all others.'
But the Washington court's approach to this and other patent problems
is a hazard of sorts to mass production of patents, and as such it tends
to, minimize their restrictive power.
With the foregoing facts at hand, it is possible to form a fairly adequate
judgment of the proposals of the N.P.P.C. Those proposals would not
ameliorate the conditions which underlie the present agitation for reform
of the patent system: they would not solve the basic difficulty involved in
exclusive rewards for inventions; they would not insure the patents of
financially weak inventors or businesses; they would not alter the character of the patent system as the builder and protector of monopolies. If
anything, the N.P.P.C,. proposals would, on the contrary, make it easier
for large firms to acquire vast and complex aggregates of patents. This
would be the net effect of abolishing the jurisdiction of the United States
Court of Appeals of Washington, D.C.
laboratory enjoying true cooperation in its staff, nearly every important development represents the effective contributions of many workers. Unfortunately our patent law requires that
the patent application be filed in the name of an individual, or individuals. Yet it is the cooperative actuality rather than the patent technicality which the laboratory management
should stress." L A. Hawkins (Executive Engineer, Research Laboratory, General Electric
Company), "Organization and Operating Principles," in Profitable Practice in Industrial Research 71 (1932).
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Potts v. Coe, i45 F. 2d 27, 28 (App. D.C., x944).
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H.R. 97-THE, VOORMS BnIL

Though ignored by the N.P.P.C., the long-run tendencies of the patent
system emphasized here have stimulated other proposals for reform. H.R.
97, introduced in January, 1945,74
by Representative' Voorhis of California, is the 'culmination of several bills aimed at miodification of the
right's of the patentee.
The Voorhis Bill; which seems to be an honest attempt t6 return the
administratibn of -the patent system fo the federal government, subordinates patents to the public policy expessed in the antitrust laws. Except
for provisions for readier review of scope and validity of patents (secs. 27,

31), the bill is concerned almost excliisively with what is done with patents,
rather than with how they are issued. Provision is made for filing with the
Antitrust Division a complete history of every patent; the division is
made a necessary party to every patent conflict. Expressing the pragmatic
attitude displayed by Thurman Arnold in the Senate patent hearings of
1942,'175 the bill makes possible a case-by-case development of permissible
patent practice, and it insures the' dominance of the antitrust approach by
its most important section, section, 29.
The ingenious character of section 29 of the Voorhis 'Bill, which provides for compulsory licensing in a qualified sense, may be best undirstood by considering some of the arguments revolving around the' highly
disputed issue of compulsory licensing. Recoghizing the obstructive potentialities of patents, many analysts have propbsed compulsory licensing
as a means of preserving whatever there is of good in the patent system
while eliminating the bad. 'In a day when Englishmen did not think that
patents should be used to monopolize trade, for example, one writer argued
against the, then current demands for outright abolition of the patent system by proposing compulsory licensing. "In order to prevent any patent
being, under any circumstances, used'to secure a monopoly of trade," he
said, "everyone should be at liberty, to use a patent upon the payment of
a reasonable royalty ..... This arrangement would decrease patent litigation; for the most powerful inducement to infringe patents would be removed, inasmuch as it would be cheaper to pay a reasonable royalty than
' ' 76
to infringe. "
The common argumert against compulsory licensing is that as a general prescription it might discourage all inventive effort. No one would
14 H.

R. 97, 79th Cong.,

rst

Sess. (1945) is 'roposed as an amendment to the Clayton

Act.
-75 See

Senate Hearings on S. 2303 at 3279 et seq',

176 9 L. J. 752, 754 (1874).

7 7 th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
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finance the development of an invention, this argument continues, when
an outsider could come in after all the work is done, produce the given device, and sell it at a lower price than the patentee because developmental
costs would not be included. 177 Speaking as it does of "discouraging invention," this argument seems naive when one considers the judgment of
social scientists who see invention as the inevitable product of the social
process1 78 Again, the argument assumes that it is an expensive thing to
produce a patentable invention but a trifling process for an imitator to
reproduce it. Common opinion, on the contrary, is that the greatest trouble and expense lie in plant adjustment, training of personnel, marketing
arrangements, etc. Even to say that abolition of the patent system would
discourage invention or put original inventors at a disadvantage, is therefore rash. But to say that compulsory licensing would do these things
comes dose to being sheer sophistry, or nonsense. For, besides having a
head start, the patentee would have the price advantage accruing from the
receipt of royalties.
There is one situation, however, in which the common arguments
against a general compulsory licensing scheme have some persuasiveness.
Since we have allowed gigantid firms to spread their activities to many
different fields of production, their financial strength and technological
know-how make them potentially devastating competitors for a small firm
seeking to exploit a new device or process. One might have thought that
the proper thing to do, to meet this danger of pre-natal strangulation,
would be to limit the size and simplify the activities of corporations-prime desiderata on many grounds. X79 But, in the absence of such thoroughgoing reform, complete patent protection, assuming there is such a thing,
might be desirable in order to give new firms a start.x

°

It is in connection with the latter possibility that the ingenious practicality of section 29 of the Voorhis-Bill appears. Section 29 establishes no
blanket compulsory licensing requirement. Fitting the patent system into
the competitive scheme expressed in the antitrust laws, section 29 pro'77Mr. Barnett's book, Patent Property and the Anti-monopoly Laws (1943), contains all
the arguments resisting change of the patent system.
"'8See Gilfillan, The Sociology of Invention (1935); Mumford, Technics and Civilization
(1934); Vaughan, Economics of Our Patent System (1925); Epstein, Industrial Research:
o
iHeroic or Systematic, 4 Q. J. Econ. 232 (1 9 2 6); Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies of the Amercan Patent Law, 3o Am.Econ. Rev. 475 (1940); Ogburn and Thomas, Are Inventions Inevitable?, 37 Pal. Sci. Q. 83 (1922).
'79 See Simons, op. cit. supra, note 152.
iso
While generally in sympathy with some type of compulsory licensing law, Fortune has
suggested that the system "ought to contain special safeguards for the protection of the small,
rising enterprise." War and Peace and the Patent System, 26 Fortune 138 (Aug., 1942).
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vides instead that any use of a patent, "including any failure or refusal to
grant licenses thereunder which has the effect of unreasonably limiting the
supply of any article in commerce or of unreasonablyexcluding the supply of
any articlefrom commerce is hereby declared to be illegal." Similar provision
is made for price-fixing, and forfeiture of misused patents is also provided
for. Since provision is made in section 28 for filing all transactions relating
to patents with the Antitrust Division, and in section 30 for opinions by
the Attorney- General with respect to all such transactions, the chances
are, at least under the present administration, that the position of new
businesses would be sympathetically viewed if they entered into no restrictive agreements.
But this feature, which renders the Voorhis Bill immune to the strongest argument against a general compulsory licensing scheme, simultaneously leaves it open to objections of what seem to be a more important character. For one thing, the bill embodies all the slippery uncertainties with
which the Supreme Court has greased the originally vague Sherman Act.
Speaking of "unreasonable limitations on supply," and "unreasonable
exclusions" of patented devices from markets, the bill seems to be playing
an old game with the Supreme Court, which erected the rule of reason
to salvage the Sherman Act from the limbo where, perhaps, it should have
been consigned in the beginning.
It should be noted, furthermore, that tying the patent law to the antitrust laws calls upon the Antitrust Division to depart considerably from
its purely prosecutorial role; under the Voorhis Bill, the Antitrust Division assumes to a large extent the character of a regulatory commission.
Like the I.C.C., F.C.C., F.T.C., or C.A.B., it would be called upon more
and more to prejudge business transactions, and to decide in some cases
whether new businesses ought to be established. Its duty to render advance judgment on proposed patent uses distorts the "prosecutorial attitude"; an organization which has approved, perhaps recommended, a
particular use, is not in the best position to find its faults. The businessman commonly complains that government agencies know too !ttle of the
businesses they regulate. It may be that they know too much.
If as a nation we are concerned with pursuing a policy of free competition, the Voorhis Bill has much to recommend it. Providing means whereby many of the restrictive features of the patent system could be eradicated, it would at least pull many of the fangs, even if it did not kill the
serpent. In going only so far, however, it might create as many evils as it
destroyed. As long as the patent system exists, there must of necessity be
disputes. over invention, and with the increasingly rapid technological
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development which can be expected, the disputes will probably multiply.
For this probability the Voorhis Bill offers no remedy except that the
Antitrust Division is made a necessary party to all such litigation. Under
the bill, patent suits would thus become more complicated than ever; al'ready burdened with a tremendous job, the Antitrust Division would acquire an even greater load; patent-antitrust suits, already full of imponderables, would become more so. The policing job would be immense.
The job of figuring out reasonable royalties on a national and pan-industrial scale would be staggering. The Voorhis Bill is no doubt designed to
render antitrust policy more effective. A far more practicable way to do
that, though less feasible perhaps as a matter of politics, would be to
abolish the patent system. Another recent legislative proposal may be
studied profitably with this last suggestion in mind.
SENATE 702-THE KILGORE BILL
x
Senate 702, introduced by Senator Kilgore in February, 1943,11
was a
bill concerned directly with the encouragement and stimulation of science
and invention. Denounced flatly by some as deplorable evidence of the
"collectivism in the air," the Kilgore Bill had two separable purposes: in
general to create a coherent program of technological development, and
in particular to safeguard the United States as a nation by providing
machinery with which its technological know-how might be assessed and
utilized in a fruitful and efficient manner during national emergencies.
The best way to meet the name-calling is to quote the statement of policy
and purposes of the bill, and to sketch the means it proposed:

DECLARATION OF POLICY
Section r. The Congress hereby recognizes that the full development and application of the Nation's scientific and technical resources are necessary for the effective
prosecution of the war and for peacetime progress and prosperity, and that serious im-

pediments thereto consist in-

the unassembled and uncoordinated state of information concerning existing
scientific and technical resources;
the lack of an adequate appraisal, and the unplanned and improvident training,
development, and use, of scientific and technical personnel, resources, and facilities
in relation to the national need;
the consequent delay and ineffectiveness in meeting the urgent scientific and
technical problems of the national defense and essential civilian needs;
the trend toward monopolized control of scientific and technical data and other
resources with lack of access thereto in the public interest; and
the absence of an effective Federal organization to promote and coordinate, in
the national interest, scientific and technical developments.
18'78th Cong., ist Sess.
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The purposes of this Act accordingly arei. to appraise the current use of scientific and technical knowledge, facilities,
and, personnel, and to develop comprehensive national programs for the maximum
use of science and technology in the national interest in periods of peace andwar;
'2.to mobilize for the prosecution of the war all scientific and technical facilities
and personnel;
3. to facilitate after the war the transition of 'the national economy from the
tasks of war to peacetime enterprise;
S4. to assemble, coordinate, and develop for use, in the public interest, all scientific and technical data and facilities; to facilitate access to scientific and technical
information and literature and to aid and encourage the writing and publication

thereof;
5. to'promote

the full and speedy introduction of the most advanced and
effective techniques-for the benefit of agriculture, manufacturing, distribution, transportation, communication, and other phases of productive activity; for economical
and efficient Federal, State, and local government; and for the national defense
and general welfare; ,
6., to aid, encourage, and protect the research and enterprise of inventors, scientists, technicians, scientific and educational institutions, research laboratories
and Government establishments engaged in scientific and technical Work, and to
make their resultant discoveries and data more readily available, and without discrimination, to 'all sections of industry, agriculture, and the public, in order to aid
the war effort at the present time and in order to promote full employment and
higher standards of living after the war;
7. to discover and develop substitutes for strategic and critical materials, and to
promote the most beneficial use of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources;
8. to promote interest in scientific and technical education, and to provide for
all qualified persons the means of scientific and technical training and employment;
9.to provide guidance in scientific and technical matters to the President, the
Congress, and all Federal, State, and local government agencies and establishments,
and to contribute guidance and, in all proper cases, financial and other assilstance to
solution of,the technical and scientific problems of industry; agriculture, and of any
agency or establishment or individual inventor;
io. to promote the maintenance and expansion of free enterprise by making
available to smaller businesses the benefits of scientific advancement;
ix. to standardize, when in the public interest, scientific and technical designs,
practices, and specifications; and
12. to establish a natioial scientific and technical office to assure maximum cooperation and integration of the facilities and personnel of governmental and private agencies, institutionsi And employers f0othe above purposes, and to coordinate
the activity of these facilities and personnel, where necessary, in the national interest,
To accomplish the purposes of the bill, an office of scientific and technical mobilization, with an initial appropriation'of $2oo,ooQ,ooo, was to
be set up under a single administrator compensated at the rate of $12,000
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per annum. The president was to appoint, besides the administrator, six
members of a national scientific and technical board-one representative each for industry, agriculture, labor, and the consuming public, and
two members at large "who shall be scientists or technologists"-each to
be paid $xo,ooo annually. "The Board and its several members," the bill
provided, "shall perform such duties under the direction and control of the
Administrator as he may assign to them; they shall have access to all information of the Office relating to the Administration thereof." Besides
this board, the bill provided for a policy-forming committee composed of
the board plus additional representatives for technology, management,
labor, the consuming public, and such federal departments as the President should designate. This committee, serving without pay, was directed
to meet regularly, not less than once a month, "to advise and consult with
the Administrator .... upon the basic policies governing the administration of [the bill]."
In peacetime, the office was to have no power to command personal or
other services; its power would extend to taking censuses of science, extending to facilities, requirements, and personnel, and to the formulation
and promotion of specific projects, presumably on a free contract basis. In
wartime, the office was to have the customary draft powers, restricted,
however, to technical and scientific personnel and facilities, War and peace
were bridged by the census-taking function and the cumulated experience
gained in working on specific projects. It seems unnecessary to discuss the
desirability of a continuing coordinating agency, such as the bill proposed,
for war purposes. The "scientific" character of modern warfare has its own
persuasiveness.
The weakness of the Kilgore Bill, as an attempt to free the nation's
scientific and technological resources in peace as well as in war, is that the
institution it proposed had to be accommodated to the patent system. In
stead of going the whole way and giving science and technology the completely open field in which they develop most fruitfully, the bill proposed
a freedom of science only in the interstices of the patent system. Given the
authority to establish research projects, to endow privately conducted
research, to serve as a clearinghouse of scientific and technological information, and to carry new technics through the early, difficult phases of
development by the erection of pilot plants, the organization proposed in
the Kilgore Bill would fill in whatever gaps in research and invention
might result from the abolition of the patent system.
The bill operated on the assumption, however, that the patent system
is to be maintained. If the bill became law without abolishing the patent
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system, the function of the office would be limited and its operation exposed to obstructing conflicts with private organizations seeking patent
protection. The office could scarcely expect to serve so effectively as a
clearinghouse of technological development as it might in the absence of
the patent system. Conducting research with a view to patent protection,
private organizations could scarcely be blamed for withholding information; and efforts on the part of the office to secure information would create only friction. Charges of bureaucratic snooping and bungling could be
expected in large volume. There is something unlovely, too, in the fact
that the office would probably be engaged often in patent disputes. Its
work would inevitably intersect that of private organizations, even though
the patent system stood between them to draw a dividing line of mutual
intolerance, and the consequent disputes would heighten the present insanity of distrust between "business" and "government."
In the absence of the patent system, however, the trend would in all
probability be- just the other way. Private research organizations, which
would continue as necessary elements in any firm faced with the necessity
of meeting competition, would find their interests served by an organization such as the Kilgore Bill proposed. The office would provide a reservoir
of researches and ideas, open to all, from which individual firms could
draw, and upon which they could build. A relationship profitable to both
might be established between the universities and the Government. Science might flourish, and an era of competition in excellence ensue.
Having to adjust itself to the patent system was probably responsible,
finally, for the lack of clarity in the over-all conception of the bill. Were
there no patent system to cope with, the function of the office would be
simple in basic character, though comprehensive and challenging in scope.
The administrator would be required simply to do the best he could,
to promote the progress of science and useful arts. Based on the prevailing conception of the inevitability of conflict, however, the bill provided for the stock pressure groups, committees, and boards. And not only would the underpaid administrator have been required to cope with
the groups, committees, and boards; the bill further required him to exercise a considerable amount of care in disposing of the patents which he
would presumably have had a good deal of trouble in acquiring. Authorizing the administrator to issue nonexclusive licenses on patents he acquired, the bill also called upon him to render a difficult and inappropriate
judgment: "No such license,' the bill stated, "shall be granted unless the
Administrator shall first be satisfied and shallfind thatno monopoly, monopolistic practice, or unfair competitive advantage will be promoted thereby."
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The truth of the matter probably is that the patent system will always
cause trouble. Though "general semantics" has been invoked recently to
correct some of its absurdities,'8 ' and though specifics such as the objective
test of patentability or the single court of patent appeals may be submitted from time to time to patch up the system, its faults lie too deep for
remedy.
Established to promote the arts and sciences, the patent system's most
significant effect has been to create conditions which tend to inhibit progress of any kind. The patent system has been hailed as the guardian and
protector of the individual inventors when, as a matter of fact, it has helped
to create conditions wherein all individualism is becoming more and more
difficult. Stoutly defended on the score that it aids in the establishment of
new businesses, actually the patent system has operated to frustrate enterprise. People have unblushingly said that the patent system is largely
responsible for America's industrial might. As the creator of monopolies
and cartels, on the contrary, the patent system may be called, with more
respect for fact, a potential hemlock draught for America. Technological
progress of a kind has occurred, indeed, while the patent system has been
in operation. At the same time, however, monopolies, cartels, and restrictive practices of other types have flourished, to cancel the social good
possible in technological advance. The wealth created by the patent system, if any, deserves Carlyle's remark: "It is an enchanted wealth; no man
of us can yet touch it." A causal relationship between the patent system
and the restrictive practices can be proved. No causal relationship between our self-praised industrial progress and the patent system can be
proved, however. The strength of America lies in its physical endowment,
its people, and the energy liberated by its air of freedom. To attribute
this strength to the patent system is a misrepresentation, based on sheer
faith, and useful only to distort immensely important issues.
If we are concerned with promoting scientific and technological progress, and if we are concerned with approximating the conditions of free
and competitive enterprise, a simpler and more rigorously conceived version of the Kilgore Bill might help. But a less superstitious eye should be
focused on the patent system, that institution which combines the worst
features of both sacred cow and white elephant.
The patent system, at least as it is organized at present, should be
abolished. There is neither justice in nor necessity for giving monopolies in
products emanating, as most inventions do, almost imperceptibly from
the social process; especially when the recipient of the monopoly may have
18 2See Kent, General Semantics and the Patent System,
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become entitled to it (legally) only through an unequal bargain with an
actual contributor. A stimulus to invention and improvement will exist so
long as people have unsatisfied desires, and so long as men are creative
animals. If a fear should remain, however, that invention will cease without extra stimulus, alternatives are available. The type of institution proposed in the Kilgore Bill would help inventors directly, and since it would
have no compulsory powers it is difficult to see what harm the institution
could do (in the absence of a patent system). Cash awards for invention
are another alternative. Less desirable because they would entail the
difficult problem of valuing inventions, and the hopeless one of defining
them, cash awards are nevertheless preferable to the present patent system. They would at least reward inventors directly, without tying up industry as the present patent system does.
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APPENDIX
PATENT RIGHT

(A paper by Mr. J. Stirling, Esq., presented to the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce
[r86?]. Reprinted from the volume, Abolition of Patents (London: Longmans, Green,
Reader, & Dyer, 1869].)
First: Patent-right cannot be defended on the ground of justice.
The object of a Patent-Law is to establish a "property in ideas": but this involves
the double fallacy that thought can and should be appropriated. The end of all law is
to ensure the universal freedom of human action. Hence the law of property secures to
every man the product of his own labour. It gives to each an exclusive right to the material embodiment of his productive energy, to be possessed or alienated by him at
will. But in so doing it leaves unrestricted the productive energy of every other man.
The freedom of one (as represented by his property) is thus consistent with the freedom of all.
But thought cannot be appropriated. In thought there is no material product to be
made the object of a proprietary right. There is no "thing" to be possessed or alienated. The law can only, therefore, give the exclusive use of an idea to one
person by injuriously limiting the intellectual activity of all others. A Patent-right,
therefore, is less a "property in ideas" than a monopoly of thought.
Again, a true right of property is universal in its application; it extends to the products of all industry, however humble. But it is instinctively felt, that a proprietary
right applied to every individual idea would be essentially absurd. Patent-Law, therefore, is essentially partial in its application. It picks out certain favourite ideas, and
confers on them an anomalous and oppressive privilege. There seems no good reason
why the ideas of inventors should be especially favoured. An invention is a means to a
special end, and should be recompensed by him who has the end in view. If any ideas
deserve a public recompense, it is those general ideas whose application is of universal
utility. But Patent-Law ignores the discoverer of general ideas, and while conferring
rewards, at the expense of the community, on empty schemers and puffing tradesmen,
it passes over the services of a Newton or an Adam Smith. The law of Copyright, indeed, gives to the philosopher a right of property in his published and material works,
but it leaves (most justly) his ideas to be used and elaborated by whoso can and will.
Again, Patent-Law is founded on a conventional, not a natural, right. It is not, like
the ordinary law of property, based on an universal intuition of the human conscience,
but it is one of those laws by which unwise legislators have striven so long and so vainly
to give an artificial stimulus to human industry. Hence the arbitrary nature of its enactments. The ordinary right of property is unlimited in its duration-passing from
generation to generation. But common sense revolts, instinctively, against a perpetual
monopoly of thought. A Patent-Law, therefore, can never be more than a weak compromise with principle-the legislator undertaking to secure to the patentee his ideal
property during the biblical term of seven or fourteen years. Now, if the inventor have
a right at all, he has a right to more than this. To cut down a real and acknowledged
right of property to seven, or even fourteen, years were a grievous wrong. Patent-right
goes too far, or not far enough. Either a Patent is no right at all, or it is a right for all
time. If ill-founded, it is a robbery of the public; if well-founded, of the patentee.
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Mere priority affords no good ground for the exclusive right to an invention. The
free exercise of thought is the common right bf all. Wherefore if A excogitate a principle
today, and B, by independent thought, excogitate the same principle tomorrow, both
have an equal right to benefit by the disc'overy; and A has no natural right to debar B
from the legitimate fruit of his intellectual effort. It may be even that A has no real
priority of thought, buit was only more knowing, more greedy, or was simply nearer
to a patent office, and, though latest in arriving at the idea, was the first to secure a
legal monopoly of its use. To found a right on such a race for priority is evidently irrational-.,The. simultaneousness :of discoveries: and inventions by different minds, is a
well-established fact in the history of science. Certain facts and reasonings, all tending
in a given direction, are before the world. These act simultaneously on various minds,
and produce -in each the same development of thought. Now, with what justice do we
pick'out one of these many thinkers ana give him a monopoly of the common. thought?
Nor is the injustice confined to the, original idea, of which we grant a monopoly. By
tying up one idea, we stop thewhole course of thought in a given direction, and thus
interfere generally, and to an indefinite extent, with the intellectual activity of other
men.
The inventor benefits by the ideas of the community, and has, therefore, no right
to a special privilege for his idea. The universal thought of mankind is a common good;
all benefit by it freely, and all are bound freely to contribute to it. Every thinker owes
an incalculable debt to society, The inventor has the benefit of all foregone human
thought, of all existing civilization. He has the unbought, advantage of all laws, all
language, all philosophy. He has the free use of all the methods and appliances, spiritual and material, which have been painfully elaborated by the thinkers and workers of
all time. Why, then, should he alone have an exclusive privilege, in respect of the inflnitesimal addition which he may make to the work of ages?
Secondly: Patent-right cannot be justified on the lower ground of expediency. The
object of a Patent-Law, in,the, supposed interest of the community, is to stimulate
invention. But invention needs no artificial stimulus. Nature has amply provided all
needful and wholesome encouragement, in the additional profit afforded by improved
jmethods of production. In the natural course of business, every producer is spurred on
by his material interests to invent for himself or to encourage the inventions of others.
The whole history of industrial progress is an unceasing striving after improvement,
with a view to profit. The few thousand patented inventions are as nothing compared
with the innumerable improvements produced daily and hourly in the ordinary course
of business, with the vulgar view of gain. The best stimulus to invention, therefore,
will be found in the natural competition of producers; but 'Patent-Law destroys this
competition by an unjust monopoly, and thus tends indirectly to weakenthe natural
impulse-to improvement.
Invention may be even over-stimulated. In all her arrangements, Nature provides
for a due equilibrium of powers and tendencies. Thus the various faculties and temperaments of man-the sanguine and the cautious, the speculative and thepracticalare nicely balanced. The result, when things are left to themselves, is a happy coxpbination of ingenuity and caution, and, as a consequence, a continuous but prudent course
of improvement. But if, by conventional rewards, we give a factitious impulse to the
inventive faculty, we destroy the natural equilibrium of capacities, and foster a scheming, fanciful turn of mind, at the expense of thoroughness and a patient working out of

PATENTS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSALS
sound ideas. This result has actually occurred in the United States, where the factitious
value attached to invention has tended to produce an almost total sacrifice of solid
workmanship to a flimsy ingenuity.
Patent-Law does not even attain its proposed end of quickening the progress of real
improvement; on the contrary, it is found in practice seriously to hinder it, the monopoly granted to one inventor necessarily obstructing the progress of every other. Hence,
an eminent inventor has lately said: "The advance of practical science is now grievously obstructed by those very laws which were intended to encourage its progress." That
Patents seriously obstruct the natural development of ideas, is best seen by the sudden
advance which usually follows the expiry of important Patent-rights. The natural
course of improvement, dammed back by artificial obstruction during the continuance
of the Patent, is set free on its conclusion, and a new impulse is given to the development of ideas and their practical application.
But the public is not the only sufferer by Patent-right. Without doubt the heaviest
evil falls on the patentee. The inventor is led to give an excessive development to his
talent, and is seduced into reliance on a law that can give him no substantial protection.
The difficulty of defining original inventions is a practical bar to a satisfactory PatentLaw. The whole history of Patents is a long-continued story of litigation and disappointment; and the more admirable the invention, the greater is the certainty of difficulty and loss. It must be a worthless invention that the patentee is left to enjoy in
peace. Whenever a Patent is worth pirating, the inventor may depend on being involved in a maze of litigation that disturbs his peace and ruins his fortunes. And the
more the Patent privilege is extended, the worse the evil becomes; the intricacy and their
multiplicity of details baffling every attempt to define the rights of competing inventors.
At this moment the heaviest complaints against Patents come from our great inventors. They repudiate the proffered privilege as "injurious to inventors," and complain of being "borne down by an excess of protection." As is natural, they who are
most occupied with the advancement of invention, feel most acutely the grievous obstructiveness of the Patent-Law. Not enough that they have to battle with natural
difficulties; at every step they meet obstructions which a well-meaning but perverse
law places in their way. Nor do these obstructive privileges confer any real advantage
on the empty schemers whose monopoly they establish: they merely give them the
vexatious power of hindering the progress of better men. The mere "pen-and-ink inventor" has neither the energy, nor the perseverance, nor the practical ability to mature his crude "ideas"; but to this man the law awards the dog-in-the-manger privilege
of effectually obstiucting the natural progress of practical improvement.
These practical evils the advocates of Patent-Law do not deny; but they attribute
them to the defective execution of the law, not to its vicious principle. Hence a neverending cry as in the case of all bad laws, for more legislation, for more stringent regulation, for stricter investigation, and more thorough registration of Patents. But no
tinkering at details can avail. The whole system is radically unsound- and the only
effectual remedy is to lay the axe to the root.
A sentimental plea in favour of Patent-right has been set up by some, on the ground
that the inventor-the man of thought, as he is called-must be saved from the toils
of the capitalist, ever ready to prey on his superior intellect. This silly sentimentalism
could only originate in an utter ignorance of the relations which naturally subsist be-
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tween capital and talent. The capitalist is the natural ally of the inventor, whom it is
his interest to employ and encourage. It is a chief part of the business of every producer
to search out every one who can help him to improved methods of production; and the
remuneration which, in one shape or another, it is the interest of the capitalist to offer
to the really clever inventor, will always form a surer and more substantial reward
than the delusive privilege of a-legal monopoly. As to the complaints we hear of neglected talent, we may safely conclude that they arise more from the exaggerated pretensions of conceited schemers, than from any obtuseness to their own interests on the
part of practical men of business, who refuse to profit by their inventions.
On the whole, Patent-Law seems a blunder, founded on the antiquated notion of
giving State encouragement to ertain favoured modes of human activity. It is no
part of the duty of the State to stimulate or reward invention; the true function of
Government is to protect, not to direct, the exercise of human energy. By securing
perfect freedom to each individual, we shall best provide for the progress of the coinmunity; nor can any law be conceived more detrimental to the common weal than one
which lays restrictions on perfect freedom of thought.

